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1885 
Article 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment 
Forty Years Later: Toward the Realization 
of an Inclusive Regulatory Model 
Donald A. Dripps† 
I first read Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment1 in the 
autumn of 1984. I was working on an article devoted to a recent 
Supreme Court decision recognizing a new exception to the ex-
clusionary rule, and I was lucky enough to have an office four 
doors down from Wayne LaFave’s. At some point Wayne told 
me “you really have to read this,” and when Yoda speaks, the 
Jedi novitiate listens.  
I remember reading it, transfixed, at a single sitting. Of all 
the legal scholarship I have read with admiration and excite-
ment, only Democracy and Distrust—which I blundered into 
while checking citations for the law review and stayed up until 
dawn to finish—struck me so immediately and so convincingly 
as a tour de force, a classic.   
My view is not eccentric. Justices of the Supreme Court 
have cited Perspectives thirteen times.2 A 2012 study of the 
most-cited law review articles ranked Perspectives seven-
teenth.3 Not seventeenth for criminal procedure or even for 
constitutional law generally—seventeenth.  
 
†  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. This 
Article is based on remarks delivered at Minnesota Law Review’s Symposium 
on October 2, 2015. The published version benefitted greatly from the com-
ments of moderator Richard Frase, and fellow panelists Tracey Maclin and 
Andrew Crespo. Richard Re also provided helpful comments on a prior draft. 
Special thanks to Anthony Amsterdam for timely and extremely helpful com-
ments on a prior draft. Copyright © 2016 by Donald A. Dripps. 
 1. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974) [hereinafter Perspectives]. 
 2. A search of the Westlaw Supreme Court Cases database for “Amster-
dam /s perspectives on the fourth amendment” returned thirteen cases.  
 3. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review 
Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 tbl.I (2012).  
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Not only is Perspectives very widely admired. That admira-
tion seems greatest among specialists in the field—those who 
are paid to know this branch of the law and to criticize what 
has been said about it before. Those who have referred in print 
to Perspectives as a “classic” include the late Craig Bradley, 
David Sklansky, Chris Slobogin, Carol Steiker, and the late 
William Stuntz.4 I add myself to this list,5 less to pretend to lus-
ter by linkage than to prove conclusively that expressed admi-
ration for Perspectives is not confined to nice people who might 
say nice things just to be nice.  
The lectures focused on a series of questions: (1) What is 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
“searches” and “seizures”?6 (2) What interpretive method, nar-
rowly historical or broadly normative, should be used to answer 
question 1?7 (3) When the amendment does apply, what re-
strictions does it impose on government agents?8 (4) In answer-
ing the previous question should we regard the amendment as 
protecting “atomistic spheres” of individual liberty, property, 
and privacy, or as protecting a general “right of the people to be 
secure” against police practices inconsistent with the values of 
a free society?9 (5) Should the restrictions the amendment im-
 
 4. Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Crimi-
nal Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 342 (2006); David A. Sklansky, Back to the 
Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 MISS. L.J. 143, 148 n.13 (2002); 
Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: See-
ing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1425 n.146 (2002); Carol S. Steiker, “First Principles” of Constitu-
tional Criminal Procedure: A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 680, 684 n.10 
(1999); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Proce-
dure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.2 (1997). 
 5. Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Compo-
sition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 
MISS. L.J. 341, 344 n.8 (2004).  
 6. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 361–62 (“The first question is whether 
the amendment should be viewed as a restriction upon only particular methods 
of law enforcement or as a restriction upon law enforcement practices general-
ly.”).  
 7. Id. at 363 (“[A] fundamental question about the fourth amendment is 
what method should be used to identify the range of law enforcement practices 
that it governs and the abuses of those practices that it restrains.”). 
 8. Id. at 356 (proposing to address, inter alia, “the restrictions that the 
fourth amendment imposes upon those activities”).  
 9. Asking: 
My second question is whether the amendment should be viewed as a 
collection of protections of atomistic spheres of interest of individual 
citizens or as a regulation of governmental conduct. Does it safeguard 
my person and your house and h e r  papers and his effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures; or is it essentially a regulatory 
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poses be articulated as categorical rules or as fine-grained 
standards?10  
Broadly speaking, Professor Amsterdam answered these 
questions in favor of a normative, or at least very generally his-
torical approach, to questions 1 and 2,11 in favor of a “regulatory 
model” rather than the “atomistic model” with respect to ques-
tions 3 and 4,12 and in favor of rules—ideally rules written at 
least in the first instance by the police—with respect to ques-
tion 5.13  
Forty years later, the Supreme Court has largely, but not 
yet completely, adopted the perspectives defended by Professor 
Amsterdam. What explains the limited but stubborn persis-
tence of historical analysis, the atomistic perspective, and 
standards as opposed to rules? Much of the explanation lies in 
the institutional limits on judge-made law, limits Professor 
Amsterdam shrewdly yet generously surveyed. Nonetheless we 
may now foresee that technological and institutional changes 
might finally usher in a Fourth Amendment regime much like 
the one Professor Amsterdam defended.  
This Article proceeds in five stages. First, I briefly summa-
rize Perspectives and analyze just what features made it so cel-
ebrated. Second, I locate Perspectives in its particular point in 
 
canon requiring government to order its law enforcement procedures 
in a fashion that keeps us collectively secure in our persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures?  
Id. at 367 (last emphasis added). 
 10. See id. at 377 (“The question remains at what level of generality and in 
what shape rules should be designed in order to encompass all that can be en-
compassed without throwing organization to the wolves.”).  
 11. See, e.g., id. at 399 (“To suppose [the founders] meant to preserve to 
their posterity by guarantees of liberty written with the broadest latitude noth-
ing more than hedges against the recurrence of particular forms of evils suffered 
at the hands of a monarchy beyond the seas seems to me implausible in the ex-
treme.”); id. at 403. 
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if 
the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted 
to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy 
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass 
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society. 
Id. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 437 (“[U]pon a proper regulatory view of the fourth 
amendment and its implementing exclusionary rule, there is no necessary rela-
tionship between the violation of an individual’s fourth amendment rights and 
exclusion of evidence.”). 
 13. See id. at 409 (proposing “a requirement that police discretion to con-
duct search and seizure activity be tolerably confined by either legislation or po-
lice-made rules and regulations, subject to judicial review for reasonableness”). 
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legal history, shortly after the Supreme Court applied the ex-
clusionary rule to the states, a seismic shift that promptly 
called into question both the search-and-seizure practices of lo-
cal police and the libertarian orientation of the pre-Mapp fed-
eral Fourth Amendment cases. When I first read Perspectives 
in the mid-1980s I was convinced that the unification of the 
state and federal law would lead inexorably to the triumph of 
the normative perspective on Fourth Amendment scope and the 
“regulatory perspective” on Fourth Amendment content. The 
historical perspective on scope, and the “atomistic perspective” 
on content, were, I thought, destined for the ashcan of history.  
Part III considers some quite recent cases about the scope 
of the Fourth Amendment to show that while the historical 
perspective has made something of a comeback, it has returned 
in a form subtle enough to peacefully coexist with an approach 
based on contemporary social norms. Part IV makes a parallel 
point about recent rulings on Fourth Amendment content and 
remedies. The Court’s retreat from the full reach of some of its 
bright-line rules, and curtailment of the exclusionary rule, ar-
guably suggest a reversion to atomism. This view, however, is 
implausible. The overall trend is toward the regulatory per-
spective. The Court is tweaking, not abandoning, the body of 
rules it has made. On the remedial side, institutional reform 
injunctions give a glimpse of what the final triumph of the reg-
ulatory perspective might look like.  
Both historicism and an occasional reversion to standards, 
then, may be not only compatible with contemporary values 
and bright-line rules, but necessary means to the end of decent 
regulation of police whose necessary work, which always 
threatened the underclass with violence, now also threatens 
the elite with the pervasive maintenance of digital dossiers. 
The Justices are unlikely to adopt Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
whether premised on historical or contemporary values, that 
renounces any application to police use of high-tech surveil-
lance and big data. Nor are they likely to adopt Fourth 
Amendment doctrine that gives the police imprecise guidance 
about when warrants are required and about the limits of war-
rantless actions.  
Historical rhetoric will do more to destabilize pre-
information-age precedents than to deregulate hi-tech investi-
gations. Standards will reappear not to replace the corpus of 
rules but to save the corpus from perverse synergies. I see his-
toricism and atomism less as rivals than as accomplices in the 
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project of adapting the law to our present circumstances. As all 
roads once led to Rome, all perspectives now lead to giving the 
Fourth Amendment a broad scope and a regulatory content.  
In the fifth stage, I propose two concrete reforms to ad-
vance this overall project. First, rather than consult history, 
which if examined honestly and rigorously so often proves to be 
indecisive, or judicial intuition, which is vagrant and unprinci-
pled, I suggest we ask, to the extent we can, the people them-
selves about their reasonable expectations of privacy. If the 
government fails to establish an online privacy registry where 
citizens can opt out of the assumption of risks much current 
doctrine imputes to them, the courts should hold that the as-
sumption-of-risk doctrine has no application.  
Second, Congress should go beyond the Rodney King 
Law—42 U.S.C. § 14141—that authorizes the Department of 
Justice to sue police departments for structural injunctions 
when the police department has engaged in a pattern or prac-
tice of constitutional violations. The early empirical evidence on 
these decrees is promising. Congress should build on this foun-
dation by authorizing and funding the Justice Department to 
certify police departments for compliance, not just sue them for 
noncompliance. Any Congress willing to approve such a policy 
could find powerful incentives to encourage local departments 
to seek certification for best practices.  
These proposals are but examples of how we might ad-
vance progress toward Fourth Amendment doctrine based on 
values widely shared across time and among persons, articulat-
ed as rules and enforced with the goal of future compliance. 
That progress is likely to continue whatever the precise reforms 
that move it forward.  
Time may falsify my prophecy. In that case, Professor Am-
sterdam would have framed the issues for half a century with-
out the vindication of practical success. Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment would still be ranked among the master-
pieces of legal scholarship for just that—for framing deep and 
abiding issues with immense learning, acute analysis, and ex-
quisite rhetoric.  
I.  ANATOMY OF A CLASSIC   
What makes Perspectives so exemplary? In the first place, 
Perspectives is a great law review article in part because it is 
not really a law review article at all. It is the text of three lec-
tures sponsored by the Holmes Devise. They read much as they 
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must have sounded to their original audience—vigorously ar-
gued but scrupulously fair-minded, glittering with wit, erudi-
tion, and occasional flights of righteous passion.  
In the published version, this breathtaking intellectual 
cavalry charge is reinforced by the infantry, 598 notes strong. 
There may be an error somewhere among them, but I have 
never found one. Many of those notes reference collections or 
summaries of other sources, and I am quite confident, based on 
the depth of the other notes, that Amsterdam had read all the 
sources summarized or compiled. Even today this would be an 
extraordinary body of research. Assembled as it was in the days 
of index cards, photocopies, and typewriters, it is little short of 
astounding.  
So Perspectives remains a captivating read supported by 
deep research. Countless law review articles, early and late, 
fail to achieve that much. But we expect still more from schol-
arship said to set a standard of excellence for decades. We ex-
pect an original argument that adds value, even if we as read-
ers conclude that the argument is, in some or even all respects, 
mistaken. If you finish reading something in your field and re-
alize that you will never think about your field as you have be-
fore, then you have just finished reading a classic.  
For me, Perspectives passed this litmus test not once, but 
at least four separate times. First, Perspectives previewed an 
extended critique of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with a 
remarkably acute, generous, and prescient analysis of the chal-
lenges faced by the Supreme Court in expounding the amend-
ment.14 Amsterdam recognized that the Court is a committee, 
that cannot always openly articulate all the reasons for its de-
cisions, and that must decide particular cases based largely on 
the pull of their facts when these may not yet be, if ever they 
shall be, ripe for translation into general doctrinal formula-
tions.  
I say “prescient” because Perspective’s prolegomenon on the 
difficulties of Supreme Court decision-making adumbrated a 
considerable body of justly celebrated future scholarship. Does 
not Amsterdam’s account of the Fourth Amendment as the 
camel produced by a committee tasked with designing a horse 
resonate with Judge Easterbrook’s application of Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem to the Supreme Court15—published a 
 
 14. See id. at 350–52.  
 15. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
802 (1982).  
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decade later in the Harvard Law Review?  
Consider Amsterdam on the Court’s obligation to decide 
concrete cases in the context of rapid technological and social 
change: 
The Supreme Court ordinarily must decide the case before it. It must 
do so even though it is not prepared to announce the new principle in 
terms of comparable generality with the old, still less to say how 
much the old must be displaced and whether or how the old and new 
can be accommodated. If the Court declines to give birth to the new 
principle, it will never acquire the experience or the insight to answer 
these latter questions. If it attempts to answer them at the moment of 
the new principle’s birth, it is not likely to answer them wisely.16  
Does this not resonate with Cass Sunstein’s analysis of “judicial 
minimalism,”17 published a quarter of a century later by the 
Harvard University Press?  
Second, in discussing his first two questions on the reach of 
the Fourth Amendment and constitutional methodology, Am-
sterdam brilliantly mediated between a narrow focus on the spe-
cific abuses inspiring the amendment—general warrants and 
writs of assistance—and an unconstrained equation of “reasona-
ble” with modern values. He rejected exclusive reliance on specif-
ic practices because he correctly understood writs of assistance 
and general warrants as examples of a larger class, which might 
not have drawn the specific animosity of the founders only by the 
turn of the chances of class or politics. Does this not resonate 
with Professor Jed Rubenfeld’s distinction between “founding era 
application understandings” and “founding era no application 
understandings,”18 published thirty years later in the Yale Law 
Journal?  
Amsterdam rejected a narrow focus on writs of assistance 
and general warrants. He said, “Growth is what statesmen ex-
pect of a Constitution.”19 He thought instead the amendment au-
thorized and required posterity to determine the content of “un-
reasonable searches and seizures” by “our own lights”20 bearing 
in mind the abuses that inspired, but did not delimit, the consti-
tutional provision.  
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is whether, if 
the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted 
 
 16. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 352.  
 17. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999).  
 18. Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 
1982–90 (2006). 
 19. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 399.  
 20. Id. at 401.  
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to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy 
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass 
inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.21  
Third, Amsterdam beautifully penetrated the baseline prob-
lem in the assumption-of-risk cases. He said that the Court’s 
holding that we trust informants at our own risk reflected 
a notion of privacy or security that is entirely unworldly, as though 
these were absolute instead of relative things. The difference between 
the risk of faithlessness that we all run when we choose our friends 
and the risk of faithlessness that we run when government foists a 
multiplying army of bribed informers on us may well be a matter of 
degree; but of such degrees is liberty or its destruction engineered.22  
This characterization of privacy as both agent-relative and scalar 
continues to resonate in the literature.23  
Fourth, Amsterdam advanced the logical but strikingly orig-
inal claim that the regulatory perspective’s focus on future police 
conduct implied extending the exclusionary rule to evidence 
gathered legally as well as illegally, when the prospect of legal 
seizure gives law enforcement agents strong incentives to search 
illegally in future cases. Would we see today lawsuits like the 
Floyd litigation in New York,24 if the Supreme Court had bitten 
the regulatory bullet and held that guns, but not illegal drugs, 
found during the course of Terry stops-and-frisks could be used 
in evidence? And does not Amsterdam’s proposal to cabin stop-
and-frisk by excluding drugs found during lawful searches for 
guns resonate with the leading alternative in the literature to 
put reasonable limits on computer searches—Orin Kerr’s sug-
gestion that the time may come for eliminating the plain view 
 
 21. Id. at 403. 
 22. Id. at 407.  
 23. See David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not To Think 
About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1110 
(2014). 
[Robert] Post usefully describes privacy not as a thing that people 
have but as a set of “social norms that define the forms of respect that 
we owe to each other,” norms that are part of “the decencies of civili-
zation.” One implication of this view is that privacy is relational: the 
privacy that you have, want, or need vis-à-vis me may differ from the 
privacy that you have, want, or need vis-à-vis a third party. That is 
one reason why the Supreme Court has been wrong to declare that an 
individual can have no “legitimate expectation of privacy” in anything 
shared voluntarily with someone else—and one reason the Court has 
been right to ignore that principle when it protects, for example, the 
privacy of a telephone call. 
Id.  
 24. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(imposing a structural reform injunction on the New York City Police Depart-
ment).  
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doctrine in digital search cases,25 published thirty-three years 
later in the Harvard Law Review?  
II.  PERSPECTIVES IN PERSPECTIVE   
So Perspectives beautifully and prophetically framed the en-
tire landscape of Fourth Amendment issues. Put abstractly those 
issues are today what they were then. What government practic-
es constitute “searches” and “seizures”? What features of 
“searches and seizures” makes them reasonable or “unreasona-
ble”? And when officers commit an “unreasonable” search or sei-
zure, what remedy or sanction should follow the constitutional 
violation?  
These questions bubble up to appellate courts in the context 
of their particular times. In 1974 legal, political, and technologi-
cal developments raised new Fourth Amendment questions and 
called into question answers previously given. The principal le-
gal development was the application of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule to the states by Mapp v. Ohio in 1961.26 Mapp 
made Supreme Court rulings on the limits of law enforcement 
applicable not just to cases prosecuted in the federal courts but 
to every criminal case throughout the country.27  
The federal law enforcement system was a small sliver of 
overall American policing. In 2001, the earliest year for which I 
have found statistics broken down for arrests by federal agents, 
and after considerable growth in the relative size of the federal 
system, there were more than thirteen million total arrests, less 
than 1% of them by federal agents for federal crimes.28 What had 
 
 25. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 531, 583 (2005) (describing the case for abolishing the plain view doctrine 
in computer searches as premature but adding that “[a]bolishing the plain 
view exception may become an increasingly sound doctrinal response to the 
new dynamics of digital evidence collection and retrieval”). Recently Professor 
Kerr, without repudiating the prospect of excepting digital searches from the 
plain view doctrine, suggested that it may be more attractive to characterize 
the Fourth Amendment issue as the reasonableness of continuing seizures. 
See Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use 
Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 22 (2015) 
(“[P]erhaps the key question raised by the execution of computer warrants is 
whether use of nonresponsive data renders the ongoing seizure of the data un-
reasonable rather than whether the plain view exception applies to digital ev-
idence.”).  
 26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  
 27. Id. at 655. 
 28. UNIV. OF ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 389 
tbl.4.34 (2003), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t434.pdf (finding federal 
agencies made a total of 118,896 arrests for federal offenses); Press Release, 
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been, prior to Mapp, a constitutional regime applicable to a 
handful of FBI and Treasury agents was transposed on to a vast-
ly larger nationwide system dominated by urban police depart-
ments.  
The technological and political developments were inter-
twined. As the technology of electronic surveillance became more 
sophisticated and less expensive,29 domestic politics became po-
larized even by today’s standards.30 What the left saw as dissent 
the right saw as subversion. J. Edgar Hoover, who had overseen 
extensive warrantless electronic surveillance for political pur-
poses, died in office as Director of the FBI in 1972.31 Richard 
Nixon, who also superintended warrantless eavesdropping for 
political purposes, was reelected that November after the arrest 
of his operatives attempting to bug Democratic Party offices at 
the Watergate Hotel in June.32 
These developments already had drawn the attention of the 
Supreme Court. In 1968, the Terry decision attempted to fit the 
square peg of urban street patrol into the round hole of the 
Fourth Amendment.33 The result was a sort of search-and-
seizure light, in which temporary detention for investigation and 
incidental protective search could be justified without warrant 
given facts that, although suspicious, fell short of probable 
cause.34  
 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the U.S. 2001 (Oct. 28, 2002), https:// 
www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/crime-in-the-united-states-2001-1 
(“Law enforcement made an estimated 13.7 million arrests for criminal offens-
es (excluding traffic violations) in 2001, a 2.1-percent decline from the 2000 
estimated total.”). 
 29. See Audiotechnics, New Detection Equipment (1960), MURRAY ASSO-
CS., http://www.spybusters.com/History_1960_Audiotechnics.html (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2016) (exhibiting a 1960 ad for surveillance equipment including 
“midget pocket dictograph” and “double pen register and listening unit”).  
 30. See, e.g., TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE 
285–88 (1993).  
 31. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1132 (2002) (“As fears of 
Communism escalated and the authority to engage in electronic surveillance 
increased, widespread abuses began to occur. Hoover substantially abused his 
wiretapping authority by extensively wiretapping FBI critics, individuals 
whose views he disliked, and the enemies of his political allies.”). 
 32. The first Article of Impeachment approved by the House Judiciary 
Committee charged Nixon with the cover-up of the burglary. The second 
charged, inter alia, abuse of electronic surveillance by the FBI and Secret Ser-
vice. See Articles of Impeachment, WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info/ 
impeachment/articles-of-impeachment (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
 33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 34. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 n.7 (1981). 
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In 1967 the Katz decision famously brought interception of 
telephone communications under the rubric of Fourth Amend-
ment “searches.”35 Pre-Katz decisions held that the employment 
of informants was not a “search,” even when this involved entry 
of private premises by fraud.36 What then of the case where the 
informant, his spying not subject to the Fourth Amendment, 
wears a hidden microphone that transmits the suspect’s every 
word to agents monitoring, perhaps recording, it from a remote 
location? In 1971, the Court held that electronic monitoring did 
not convert spying into a “search” subject to the warrant re-
quirement.37  
Against this background the various themes in Perspectives 
made a great deal of sense. Legislative default left regulation of 
police practices to the courts. The volume of ordinary criminal 
cases raising Fourth Amendment issues, after incorporation, 
demanded the articulation of doctrine as concrete bodies of cate-
gorical rules rather than leaving police and lower courts to guess 
about how the overall mantle of reasonableness applied in, liter-
ally, millions of cases. Surveillance technology, an indispensable 
law-enforcement tool prone to nefarious political abuse, had to be 
subjected to similar discretion-limiting doctrinal rules. And the-
se rules would have made no difference unless they were backed 
 
In upholding the “frisk” employed by the officer in that case, the 
Court assumed, without explicitly stating, that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit forcible stops when the officer has a reasona-
ble suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. See 392 
U.S., at 32–33 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 34 (White, J., concur-
ring). In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S., at 146, the Court made explicit 
what was implicit in Terry: 
  “A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his 
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining 
more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known 
to the officer at the time.” 
Id. 
 35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that conceal-
ing a microphone on a telephone booth constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
“search”).  
 36. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302–03 (1966) (holding that 
recruiting a close friend to spy on the suspect does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment “search”); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 206–07, 212 
(1966) (holding that undercover officer’s entry of suspect’s home by misrepre-
senting identity does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search”); Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963) (holding that secret recording of con-
versation by one known by the suspect to be a government agent does not con-
stitute a Fourth Amendment “search”). 
 37. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1971) (holding that the 
secret recording of an undercover agent’s conversation with a suspect, includ-
ing in suspect’s home, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search”).  
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by a remedial scheme that gave strong incentives for compliance 
in future cases.  
One more tribute must be laid at the feet of Perspectives. It 
predicted, and may have encouraged, the Supreme Court’s quiet 
but emphatic shift away from the historicism of Olmstead and 
the atomism of Boyd. For almost four decades following Perspec-
tives, the Court indeed saw the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
through a normative rather than historical lens, and the content 
of the Fourth Amendment through a regulatory rather than at-
omistic perspective.38  
This can be hard to see because the majority of Justices on 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts held quite different values 
than Professor Amsterdam’s. They nonetheless approached the 
meaning of “searches” from a normative viewpoint, and the 
meaning of “unreasonable” with a forward-looking focus on 
bright-line rules. Regarding scope, such cases as Miller39 and 
Smith40 extending the assumption-of-risk doctrine to bank rec-
 
 38. As Professor Sklansky rightly notes, the framework established by 
Katz was “firmly ahistoric.” Sklansky, supra note 4, at 146; see also Dripps, 
supra note 5, at 343–44. 
The basic methodology of balancing, which runs through the Burger 
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases, is essentially legislative in form. 
One might argue that in this case, constitutional text delegates this 
sort of rule-making authority to the courts (a position I myself en-
dorse), but if one were to design an analytical framework for the very 
purpose of provoking the charge of legislating from the bench, you 
could not do much better than a framework that calls upon courts to 
issue rules based on a balancing of interests.  
  The troubling subjectivity of interest-balancing did not induce a 
political outcry, probably because the Court was balancing interests 
with a thumb on the scales in favor of law enforcement. However, it 
did induce a reaction within the Court itself. Justice Scalia, rebelling 
against the subjectivity of rule-making based on interest-balancing, 
argued that the Court should consult founding-era common-law prac-
tice as a guide to Fourth Amendment interpretation. 
Dripps, supra note 5, at 343–44 (footnotes omitted).  
 39. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) (holding that a sub-
poena for suspect’s bank records supported only by representation that the 
records were relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation did not violate sus-
pect’s Fourth Amendment rights). A subsequent statute, the Right to Finan-
cial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012), provided that the gov-
ernment notify the customer that it had ordered the customer’s records, with 
notice and an opportunity to move to quash. The governing standard for sub-
poenas remained mere relevance, and § 3409 permits the government to delay 
notice by a showing that notice would endanger the investigation.  
 40. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that warrantless 
use of a pen register to record numbers of suspect’s outgoing calls does not vio-
late Fourth Amendment). Congress responded by requiring law enforcement 
agents to obtain a court order before using either a pen register or a “trap and 
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ords and pen registers made no reference to the foundational 
abuses of general warrants and writs of assistance. The Katz 
formula became the preface to the application of contemporary 
values by a conservative judiciary.41 Citizens have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy against subpoenas for their bank or credit 
card records because the Justices, not the founders, approved of 
such methods of law enforcement.  
With respect to content the Court acknowledged the need for 
rules as early as the Robinson decision in 1974.42 With respect to 
inventory searches of impounded vehicles, the Court held that 
otherwise legal searches violate the Fourth Amendment unless 
conducted pursuant to police-promulgated administrative rules.43 
In general, however, the Court responded to the need for rules 
and legislative abdication by deriving specific rules from the 
general language of the Fourth Amendment. Searches incident 
to arrest could extend to all effects on the person44 or in the pas-
 
trace” device, but, as in the aftermath of Miller, the orders are issued on a 
showing of relevance rather than reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See 
18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012).  
 41. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (stating that in Katz the Court emphasized 
that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection” (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))); id. (“We must examine the nature of the particu-
lar documents sought to be protected in order to determine whether there is a 
legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.”); see also Smith, 
442 U.S. at 739 (“In determining whether a particular form of government-
initiated electronic surveillance is a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States . . . .” (alterations in origi-
nal) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).  
 42. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“[O]ur more fun-
damental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion 
that there must be litigated in each case the issue of whether or not there was 
present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person 
incident to a lawful arrest. We do not think the long line of authorities of this 
Court dating back to Weeks, or what we can glean from the history of practice 
in this country and in England, requires such a case-by-case adjudication.”). 
 43. See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (“Our view that standardized 
criteria, or established routine must regulate the opening of containers found 
during inventory searches is based on the principle that an inventory search 
must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating 
evidence.” (citations omitted)).  
 44. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest 
which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of no moment that [Officer] 
Jenks did not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not 
himself suspect that respondent was armed. Having in the course of a lawful 
search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to in-
spect it; and when his inspection revealed the heroin capsules, he was entitled 
to seize them . . . .”). 
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senger compartment of an arrested motorist’s vehicle,45 even 
when the specific facts suggested no danger to police or the pos-
sibility of recovering evidence that might otherwise be lost. The 
vehicle exception to the warrant requirement extended to any 
vehicle actually mobile, even when the vehicle is parked under 
police surveillance across the street from an open courthouse.46 
That exception extends to any effect within the vehicle, however 
temporarily and coincidentally present there.47 If we leave aside 
irreducibly fact-sensitive determinations of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion, the main area of Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness doctrine based on the “totality of the circumstances” 
is the voluntariness, and scope, of consent searches.48  
Indeed no Justice has called for analyzing Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness in the totality of circumstances in each 
case. Rules are favored, and the dispute among Justices in 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness cases turns on the desirabil-
 
 45. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981), abrogated by Arizo-
na v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, 
we read Chimel’s definition of the limits of the area that may be 
searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly, we hold that 
when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant 
of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that ar-
rest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.  
  It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine 
the contents of any containers found within the passenger compart-
ment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the ar-
restee, so also will containers in it be within his reach. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
 46. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 404 (1985) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“In this case, the motor home was parked in an off-the-street lot only 
a few blocks from the courthouse in downtown San Diego where dozens of 
magistrates were available to entertain a warrant application. . . . In the ab-
sence of any evidence of exigency in the circumstances of this case, the Court 
relies on the inherent mobility of the motor home to create a conclusive pre-
sumption of exigency.” (footnote omitted)). 
 47. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999) (“When there is 
probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police of-
ficers—like customs officials in the founding era—to examine packages and 
containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one. A 
passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or containers 
attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the officer 
has probable cause to search for contraband in the car.”).  
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2002) (“The 
Court has rejected in specific terms the suggestion that police officers must 
always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to con-
duct a warrantless consent search. . . . Instead, the Court has repeated that 
the totality of the circumstances must control, without giving extra weight to 
the absence of this type of warning.”).  
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ity of one rule or another.49 Like the scope of “searches and sei-
zures,” moreover, the content of these rules was derived from 
contemporary values and pragmatic policy considerations, rather 
than by analogy to historical practice. When the opinions on rea-
sonableness did refer to history, they made it clear that history 
might inform, but did not control, the decisions.50  
The law of Fourth Amendment remedies has followed a sim-
ilar regulatory path. From the Calandra decision in 1974, the 
Court treated the exclusionary rule as justified solely by prospec-
tive deterrence.51 Such exceptions as those for standing and 
good-faith reliance on warrants or statutes followed from the 
improbability of deterring future police violations.52 The doc-
trines of qualified immunity and interlocutory appeal in tort 
suits against the police followed from the same regulatory per-
spective. The risk of suit is thought to discourage lawful but bor-
derline police actions, calling for both qualified immunity53 and 
 
 49. See, e.g., Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–57 (1991) 
(holding that a presumption of unconstitutional warrantless arrest arises after 
forty-eight hours of detention without presentment to a judicial officer); id. at 
68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The data available are enough to convince me, 
however, that certainly no more than 24 hours is needed.”).  
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (“We would not, 
therefore, be foreclosed by principles of stare decisis from further examination 
into history and practice in order to see whether the sort of qualifications im-
posed by the Court of Appeals in this case were in fact intended by the Fram-
ers of the Fourth Amendment or recognized in cases decided prior to Weeks. 
Unfortunately such authorities as exist are sparse.”).  
 51. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (“Instead, the 
rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby ef-
fectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
searches and seizures: ‘The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its pur-
pose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 52. See id. at 348 (“This standing rule is premised on a recognition that 
the need for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are 
strongest where the Government’s unlawful conduct would result in imposi-
tion of a criminal sanction on the victim of the search.”); see also United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s 
error [in issuing a warrant without probable cause], rather than his own, can-
not logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.”).  
 53. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (“The gen-
eral rule of qualified immunity is intended to provide government officials 
with the ability ‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to 
liability for damages.’ Where that rule is applicable, officials can know that 
they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable 
in light of current American law.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (“As recognized at common law, 
public officers require this protection to shield them from undue interference 
  
1900 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1885 
 
interlocutory review when immunity is denied.54 Immunity and 
interlocutory review reduce that risk by leaving some victims of 
unconstitutional police action without any remedy at all.55  
Perspectives argued for pursuing the regulatory model to the 
logical conclusion of suppressing evidence lawfully obtained 
when exclusion was necessary to deter illegal conduct in future 
cases.56 The Justices have balked at this. The inevitable discov-
ery exception to the exclusionary rule has the practical effect of 
sanitizing illegal searches.57 The plain view doctrine, including 
the Terry-frisk “plain feel” analogue,58 unconstrained by any in-
 
with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.”).  
 54. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (holding that the denial of 
a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an appealable 
pre-trial collateral order); id. at 525–26 (“At the heart of the issue before us is 
the question whether qualified immunity shares this essential attribute of ab-
solute immunity—whether qualified immunity is in fact an entitlement not to 
stand trial under certain circumstances. The conception animating the quali-
fied immunity doctrine . . . is that ‘where an official’s duties legitimately re-
quire action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public 
interest may be better served by action taken “with independence and without 
fear of consequences.”’ . . . [T]he ‘consequences’ with which we were concerned 
in Harlow are not limited to liability for money damages; they also include ‘the 
general costs of subjecting officials to the risks of trial—distraction of officials 
from their governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, and deter-
rence of able people from public service.’ Indeed, Harlow emphasizes that even 
such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as ‘[i]nquiries 
of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.’” (citations 
omitted)).  
 55. For example, when police execute a search warrant issued without 
probable cause, they violate the search victim’s Fourth Amendment rights, but 
under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the evidence will not be sup-
pressed absent an objectively unreasonable belief that probable cause exists. 
See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986) (“[T]he same standard of objec-
tive reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in 
Leon, defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a 
warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.” (citations omitted)); cf. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The Court as-
sumes that the searches in these cases violated the Fourth Amendment, yet 
refuses to apply the exclusionary rule because the Court concludes that it was 
‘reasonable’ for the police to conduct them. In my opinion an official search 
and seizure cannot be both ‘unreasonable’ and ‘reasonable’ at the same time.”).  
 56. See Perspectives, supra note 1, at 437 (“My legal justification is that, 
upon a proper regulatory view of the fourth amendment and its implementing 
exclusionary rule, there is no necessary relationship between the violation of an 
individual’s fourth amendment rights and exclusion of evidence.”). 
 57. For example, “inevitable discovery” during an “inventory search” has 
rescued evidence otherwise inadmissible under Arizona v. Gant. See, e.g., Scott 
R. Grubman, Bark with No Bite: How the Inevitable Discovery Rule Is Under-
mining the Supreme Court’s Decision in Arizona v. Gant, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 119, 161 n.389 (2011) (listing cases).  
 58. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“We think that this 
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advertent discovery requirement,59 likewise encourages subject-
ing innocent people to speculative stops.60 In short, the Court has 
tolerated illegal police conduct to encourage legal police conduct, 
but has refused to condemn legal police conduct to discourage il-
legal conduct.  
So from 1974 until the turn of the millennium the Court 
adopted Amsterdam’s normative and regulatory perspectives, 
but applied them so as to limit the scope, and relax the content, 
of the Fourth Amendment. The worldviews of individual Justices 
surely played some part in this. The increase in violent crime in 
the 70s and 80s, coupled with the increasingly pervasive sense 
that drug crimes, so often the offense of arrest in Fourth 
Amendment cases, were morally equivalent to violent crimes, al-
so surely played a part. I turn now to some portentous changes 
in Fourth Amendment law since the advent of the new millenni-
um.  
III.  WINDS OF CHANGE: FOURTH AMENDMENT SCOPE   
Broadly speaking, Professor Amsterdam contrasted a nar-
rowly historical judicial approach to the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope with a more generally historical, and more openly norma-
tive, judicial approach. “Searches and seizures” should be seen 
not solely as violations of individual rights but as instances of 
police practices that if “permitted to go unregulated by constitu-
tional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining 
to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with 
the aims of a free and open society.”61 If the Fourth Amendment 
 
[plain view] doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which 
an officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise 
lawful search.”).  
 59. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (“We conclude that 
even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain-view’ 
seizures, it is not a necessary condition.”). 
 60. Police use of stop-and-frisk as a pretext was recognized as early as 
Perspectives itself, where Amsterdam, after quoting the statement “[p]olice 
power exercised without probable cause is arbitrary” from the AACP LDF brief in 
Terry, wrote “[a]nyone who has witnessed the administration on the streets or 
in a trial court of the stop-and-frisk powers that the Supreme Court subsequent-
ly validated knows that this most dire of predictions proved to be an under-
statement.” Perspectives, supra note 1, at 395. For more recent evidence, see, for 
example, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1034, 2013 WL 4046209 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013); Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect 
Searches: Assessing Police Behavior Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOL-
OGY & PUB. POL’Y 315 (2004) (finding that 30% of observed Terry stops violat-
ed Fourth Amendment even when coding borderline cases as legal).  
 61. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 403.  
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were deemed applicable, he favored a forward-looking regulatory 
perspective over the retrospective atomistic perspective.62  
In the years after Perspectives the empty Katz formula gov-
erned the definition of “searches,” and reasonableness was de-
termined by pragmatic balancing of contemporary interests ex-
pressed as generally pro-government bright-line rules. A 
working majority of the Court held a very different vision than 
Professor Amsterdam’s of when, if surveillance were “permitted 
to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of pri-
vacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a 
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.”63  
Cases in the new millennium have departed from this pat-
tern. A rival to the pro-law-enforcement understanding of Katz 
has emerged, in the form of a historical understanding of the 
baseline set by Katz.64 The old notion of search as trespass has 
resurfaced as a supplement to this marriage of Katz with 
originalism.65 The Justices likewise have qualified the bright-line 
rules they developed to define the boundaries of reasonable and 
unreasonable searches. No longer may police automatically 
search vehicles incident to arrest of the occupant,66 or pry into 
the cell phone of a suspect taken into custody.67  
For those used to the steady drumbeat of prosecution wins 
in Fourth Amendment cases during the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century, the list of important cases won by the defense and 
lost by the government is, well, an arresting development. Yet 
changes in personnel have not wrought major changes in the 
Court’s collective center of ideological balance. Apparently the 
combination of interlocking safe-harbor rules for the police and 
increasingly powerful surveillance techniques has inspired 
something of a comeback for the civil liberties side of the bal-
ance.  
The question of Fourth Amendment scope is logically prior 
to the question of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. So let us 
examine changing technology’s pressure on doctrine about the 
scope of “searches and seizures” before I turn to the evolutionary 
forces working on the definition of reasonableness. I start with 
the emergence of Justice Scalia’s historical test, then describe 
 
 62. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 63. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 403. 
 64. See infra text at note 99. 
 65. See infra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
 66. See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 67. See infra notes 184–85 and accompanying text. 
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how the Court has resurrected trespass analysis to evade grap-
pling with the application of the Katz test to the pervasive moni-
toring modern technology makes possible. The trespass dodge, 
however, is only temporary. Lower courts are hearing challenges 
to pervasive location surveillance, accomplished without any 
trespass. Whether considered from a historical or a contempo-
rary vantage point, these cases are likely to lead to major modifi-
cations of the assumption-of-risk and third-party doctrines.  
A. KYLLO AND THE NEW HISTORICISM  
As the twenty-first century opened, the contemporary values 
approach was challenged by a new historicism in Kyllo v. United 
States.68 Federal agents obtained a warrant to search Kyllo’s 
home for marijuana based on a showing of probable cause that 
included evidence collected by a thermal imager. The imager de-
tected infrared radiation emanating from the home and created 
a picture of intense heat sources inside. These heat sources 
might be perfectly legal, such as a pottery kiln or indoor lights 
used to grow rare orchids. They might also be produced by indoor 
grow lights used to grow marijuana.  
The agents obtained their warrant based on the infrared 
images and other evidence. Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence 
found through the use of the thermal imager. If use of the im-
ager were classified as a “search” of Kyllo’s home, it would have 
been a search based on questionable probable cause and the un-
questionable absence of a warrant.  
The case was hard, because the technology revealed details 
of life inside the home by reading radiation that the homeowner, 
knowingly or unknowingly, generated without any pressure by 
government agents. Justice Stevens applied the assumption-of-
risk cases and would have held that there was no search.69 Jus-
tice Stevens, however, wrote for the dissenters.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion saw the new technology as 
a threat to founding-era values: 
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding 
the home’s interior that could not otherwise have been obtained with-
out physical “intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” consti-
tutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is 
 
 68. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
 69. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is, in my judgment, a dis-
tinction of constitutional magnitude between ‘through-the-wall surveillance’ 
that gives the observer or listener direct access to information in a private ar-
ea, on the one hand, and the thought processes used to draw inferences from 
information in the public domain, on the other hand.”). 
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not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information ob-
tained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a 
search.70 
The imager provided information about the home that gov-
ernment agents could not have learned in 1791 without a physi-
cal entry.  
It would be a mistake to equate Justice Scalia’s trespass 
test as equating Fourth Amendment searches, one for one and 
jot for jot, with actionable trespasses under the common law, 
whether vintage 1791 or vintage 2013.71 Justice Scalia’s histori-
cism is not the extreme position criticized in Perspectives, the 
position—rejected, as Perspectives pointed out, not just by Katz 
but by Boyd back in the nineteenth century72—that the 
Amendment condemns only forcible home invasions under gen-
eral warrants.  
Rather, Justice Scalia aims to “assur[e] preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”73 That is indeed a histor-
ical approach, but one very much in the spirit of Boyd and cele-
brated by Professor Amsterdam.74 As police technology advanc-
es, translating how its use might have been viewed at the 
founding, when professional police departments themselves 
were an unimagined institution, turns more and more on the 
values we impute to the founders. As Professor Amsterdam 
pointed out, there is a standing temptation to impute one’s own 
 
 70. Id. at 34–35 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).  
 71. See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 188 (“Kyllo asks a different question 
about the past: not whether the challenged government conduct would have 
constituted an illegal search or seizure at common law, but whether the con-
duct, if constitutionally unregulated, would ‘shrink the realm of . . . privacy . . . 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (footnote omitted)).  
 72. See Perspectives, supra note 1, at 364–65.  
 73. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.  
 74. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (“Though the pro-
ceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual 
search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, 
and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing 
in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional 
practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by 
adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person 
and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction de-
prives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance.”). 
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values to the framers.75 In Fourth Amendment cases, at least, 
the line between originalism and the living constitution has be-
gun to blur.76  
B. JONES, JARDINES AND THE CURRENT TRUCE BETWEEN KATZ  
AND THE NEW HISTORICISM 
The two recent trespass-based decisions—Jones v. United 
States77 and Florida v. Jardines78—do more to reinforce conver-
gence than to suggest the distinctiveness of contemporary and 
historical perspectives. 
Antoine Jones [was the target of a federal narcotics investigation.] . . . 
[A]gents installed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of the 
Jeep while it was parked in a public parking lot. Over the next 28 
days, the Government used the device to track the vehicle’s move-
ments, and once had to replace the device’s battery when the vehicle 
was parked in a different public lot in Maryland. By means of signals 
from multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location 
within 50 to 100 feet, and communicated that location by cellular 
phone to a Government computer. It relayed more than 2,000 pages of 
data over the 4–week period.79 
The agents had obtained a warrant but the government 
conceded that the surveillance just described exceeded the war-
rant’s limits on the location and length of the monitoring.80  
In one of those committee decisions Professor Amsterdam 
described, the Court unanimously held that the use of the GPS 
tracking device on the suspect’s vehicle was a “search” subject 
to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Harmony on 
decision accompanied cacophony on rationale.81 Justice Scalia, 
in a majority opinion joined without separate comment by Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, con-
 
 75. See Perspectives, supra note 1, at 400 (“To be sure, the framers appre-
ciated the need for a powerful central government. But they also feared what a 
powerful central government might bring, not only to the jeopardy of the 
states but to the terror of the individual. When I myself look back into that 
variegated political landscape which no observer can avoid suffusing with the 
color of his own concerns, the hues that gleam most keenly to my eye are the 
hues of an intense sense of danger of oppression of the individual.”). 
 76. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, the more sophisticated the 
originalism the more closely it resembles openly normative accounts. See Don-
ald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal 
Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1128–
31 (2012).  
 77. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
 78. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).  
 79. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.  
 80. Id. at 948 n.1.  
 81. See Perspectives, supra note 1, at 350. 
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cluded that placing the device on the suspect’s vehicle amounted 
to a trespass requiring a specific warrant.82 Justice Alito, joined 
by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Breyer, applied the Katz 
formula and concluded that the length and detail of the surveil-
lance violated prevailing expectations, and would be a search 
even if the same information were acquired by the government 
without physical trespass.83 Justice Sotomayor joined the Scalia 
opinion, making a majority, but filed a separate opinion strong-
ly hinting her sympathy for Justice Alito’s approach.84  
Justice Scalia deployed the Katz-plus-trespass formula 
again in Florida v. Jardines.85 Acting on an uncorroborated tip, 
police approached the Jardines house accompanied by a drug-
sniffing dog. The dog alerted and, after lunging about on a 
leash, sat down on the porch at the front door, indicating that 
the strongest point source of the incriminating scent was there. 
Based on the dog’s behavior, a judge issued a warrant to search 
the house. Marijuana plants were found inside.  
Twice previously the Court had ruled that the use of dogs 
to detect the odor of illegal drugs emanating from vehicles was 
not a “search.”86 This holding reflected the view that because 
the dog provides its human handlers with an opaque, binary 
indication of “drugs present” or “no drugs present” the dog does 
not invade any “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In the later 
of these precedents, Illinois v. Caballes, Justice Stevens wrote 
for the majority: 
Official conduct that does not “compromise any legitimate interest in 
privacy” is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. We have 
held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed 
 
 82. See Jones, 132 S. Ct at 949 (“The Government physically occupied pri-
vate property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that 
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).  
 83. See id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would analyze the question 
presented in this case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations 
of privacy were violated by the long-term monitoring of the movements of the 
vehicle he drove.”). 
 84. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he trespassory test ap-
plied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: 
When the Government physically invades personal property to gather infor-
mation, a search occurs. The reaffirmation of that principle suffices to decide 
this case.”); id. (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term 
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.’”(cross-reference omitted)).  
 85. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).  
 86. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
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“legitimate,” and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the 
possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy inter-
est.”87 
The dog sniff, on this account, is a “magic bullet.” It reveals 
the commission of crime and nothing else.  
Caballes approved the use of the dog during an otherwise 
lawful traffic stop. In Jardines a five-to-four majority held that 
the use of the dog on private premises, unlike by the side of the 
road, is a “search” requiring a warrant ex ante.88 Justice Scalia 
delivered a majority opinion joined by Justices Thomas, Kagan, 
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Justice Scalia characterized leading 
the dog on to the porch as a trespass under general law.89 Jus-
tice Kagan filed a separate opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor, arguing that use of the dog to detect drugs in 
homes transgressed the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
standard.90  
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer 
joined the dissent of Justice Alito. Justice Alito argued that un-
der Katz there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in odors 
emanating from the home,91 and criticized Justice Scalia’s tres-
pass theory as unsupported by legal authority.92 Justice Alito 
cited Caballes, but—like Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion—
was silent as the Sphinx about the magic bullet theory that 
provided the foundation for Caballes.93  
 
 87. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (citation omitted).  
 88. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418–19 (“The government’s use of trained 
police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 89. See id. at 1417 (“Thus, we need not decide whether the officers’ inves-
tigation of Jardines’ home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz. One 
virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps 
easy cases easy. That the officers learned what they learned only by physically 
intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish that 
a search occurred.”). 
 90. See id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The Court today treats this 
case under a property rubric; I write separately to note that I could just as 
happily have decided it by looking to Jardines’ privacy interests.”). 
 91. Id. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“I see no basis for concluding that 
the occupants of a dwelling have a reasonable expectation of privacy in odors 
that emanate from the dwelling and reach spots where members of the public 
may lawfully stand.”). 
 92. Id. (“[T]he real law of trespass provides no support for the Court’s 
holding today. While the Court claims that its reasoning has ‘ancient and du-
rable roots,’ its trespass rule is really a newly struck counterfeit.” (cross-
reference omitted)).  
 93. All Justice Alito said about Caballes was that the Court there had re-
jected an argument “very similar” to that made by Justice Kagan’s concur-
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As Professor Amsterdam perceived forty years ago, inde-
terminacy is both the strength and the weakness of the Katz 
test.94 He saw no escape from judicial value judgments and 
came down in favor of the libertarian strands in American tra-
dition.95 Justice Alito makes different judgments and can point 
to different strands. Even Justice Alito, however, sees the old 
evil of general warrants in technology’s power to collect, store, 
and process information otherwise open to public view only in 
isolated fragments.  
Now it seems clear that a majority of the current Justices 
would deem trespass-free surveillance, absent some patina of 
consent, to be a “search” requiring a warrant ex ante. If gov-
ernment agents followed a suspect’s public movements by aeri-
al surveillance, using a miniature drone the suspect cannot de-
tect, we need only add together the Sotomayor and Alito 
opinions in Jones to make a majority. Nor should we exclude 
the very real possibility that Justice Scalia and/or Justice 
Thomas would find such surveillance inconsistent with “that 
degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.”96  
In Jones, Justices Scalia, Thomas and Sotomayor preferred 
to rule on the narrow trespass-to-chattels ground, rather than 
decide the broader reasonable-expectation-of-privacy ground. 
This seems anachronistic. As Justice Alito pointed out, what 
seems normatively troubling about the surveillance of Jones 
was not planting the tracking device on his jeep.97 Were police 
tailing a suspect at night to stick a small piece of reflective tape 
on the rear bumper of the suspect’s car, there would be a tres-
pass but only a very minor infringement of privacy. What was 
troubling about Jones was the length and detail of the location 
information acquired by the government.  
 
rence. Justice Alito did not distinguish between odors evidencing only contra-
band inside the home and those evidencing, for example, Thanksgiving dinner. 
Id. at 1424–25. 
 94. See Perspectives, supra note 1, at 385 (“In the end, the basis of the Katz 
decision seems to be that the fourth amendment protects those interests that 
may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection.”). 
 95. See supra note 11. 
 96. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 97. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 961 (2012) (Alito, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really important 
(the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and instead attaches 
great significance to something that most would view as relatively minor (at-
taching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not interfere in 
any way with the car’s operation).”). 
  
2016] TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE REGULATORY MODEL 1909 
 
C. KATZ, HISTORY, AND TRESPASS-FREE SURVEILLANCE 
It seems improbable that any Justice, let alone a majority, 
has any interest in going back to Olmstead’s strict trespass 
test.98 Justice Scalia described the test as Olmstead’s trespass 
test plus the Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test.99 
Justice Sotomayor openly stated her sympathy for Justice 
Alito’s Katz analysis.100 So when trespass-free pervasive loca-
tion surveillance reaches the Court, the government will be 
most unlikely to fend off the warrant requirement on the 
ground that there was no physical intrusion.  
These trespass-free surveillance cases are on their way. 
Cell phone site tower records provide significant but imprecise 
information about the physical location of a suspect’s cell 
phone.101 Government collection of these records by court order, 
supported by a lesser standard than probable cause, are now 
the subject of conflicting rulings in the lower courts.102  
The government can distinguish Jones in at least three 
ways. First, unlike in Jones, there is no physical trespass to 
chattels. Like the beepers in the Knotts and Karo cases,103 the 
suspect knowingly took possession of his cell phone. Indeed, un-
 
 98. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (holding that 
wiretapping is not a “search,” and stating: “The language of the amendment 
cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the 
whole world from the defendant’s house or office.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (“[T]hough 
Katz may add to the baseline, it does not subtract anything from the Amend-
ment’s protections ‘when the Government does engage in [a] physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area . . . .’”). 
 100. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“As Justice 
Alito incisively observes, the same technological advances that have made pos-
sible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz test by 
shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”). 
 101. For a primer on how the phone’s signals to the towers can indicate the 
location of the phone, see Phil Locke, Cell Tower Triangulation—How It 
Works, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (June 1, 2012), http://www.wrongful 
convictionsblog.org/2012/06/01/cell-tower-triangulation-how-it-works. 
 102. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en 
banc) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone site tower 
data); accord In re U.S. Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 
2013). Contra United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355–57 (4th Cir. 2015) 
reh’g en banc granted, 624 Fed. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015).  
 103. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that a warrant 
is required to monitor a concealed tracking device while the device is inside a 
private premises and revealing the continued presence of the device therein); 
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy against concealment of a tracking device inside a package so 
long as the package was in a public space where it might be observed).  
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like the suspect who receives a package with a concealed 
transmitter, the suspect may well be aware of the phone’s posi-
tioning capability.  
This distinction seems unconvincing. Based on the Alito 
and Sotomayor opinions in Jones, it seems probable that at 
least five Justices see the “search” in the surveillance, not the 
trespass. The Kyllo founding-era expectations test probably 
would not necessarily lead to a different conclusion. Justice 
Scalia’s test calls upon the Court to “assures preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”104 Every term is im-
portant, including “against government.” 
Technology permitted some monitoring of movements. A 
snoop with a spyglass on a hill could observe public movements 
within a radius of several miles. But the technology was lim-
ited. Such spying could only be done in daylight and was lim-
ited to the line of sight. Bloodhounds might track a fugitive 
even by night, but only if given a source scent and even then it 
was only a matter of time before the dogs lost the scent. Nor 
could baying hounds track a suspect’s every move without 
alerting the suspect to the surveillance. 
More importantly, the primitive technology of surveillance 
had no professional operatives. Professional urban police forces 
arose in the United States only fifty years after ratification of 
the Fourth Amendment.105 Who would have watched from the 
hillside, or handled the dogs, for twenty-eight days, around the 
clock? No one.  
Drawing this kind of analogy between modern institutions 
and technology and founding-era institutions and technology is 
at best an inexact process.106 Those who undertake it inevitably 
will be drawn to analogies that comport with their own values 
and experience. As Professor Amsterdam put it, “the values 
 
 104. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001). 
 105. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN 
AMERICA 87–113 (5th ed. 2004) (describing the formation of the first American 
municipal police departments in the 1830s and 1840s). 
 106. Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 n.3 (“[The concur-
rence] posits a situation that is not far afield—a constable’s concealing himself 
in the target’s coach in order to track its movements. There is no doubt that 
the information gained by that trespassory activity would be the product of an 
unlawful search—whether that information consisted of the conversations oc-
curring in the coach, or of the destinations to which the coach traveled.”), with 
id. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]his would have required either a gi-
gantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both—not to mention a constable with 
incredible fortitude and patience.”). 
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which one finds in the history of the Bill of Rights are inelucta-
bly one’s own.”107 We can, by dint of considerable research, de-
termine particular details of many founding-era practices. Jus-
tice Scalia’s test, however, looks to the degree of privacy those 
practices protected, a far less determinate question. As Justice 
Alito pointed out, Justice Scalia’s bypassing privacy by focusing 
on trespass seems “artificial,”108 and it would be odd for a Justice 
to embrace an artificial theory to reach a result contrary to pow-
erful anterior moral or legal commitments.  
So the government would be well advised to advance the two 
other lines of plausible distinction between cell phone location 
surveillance and Jones. Unlike the tracking device in Jones, di-
rectional site tower data do not pinpoint location with GPS ac-
curacy.109 Many modern phones have GPS capability,110 but the 
current crop of cases do not involve GPS location data.111  
The distinction has some force. Government awareness of 
the neighborhood you are in is less sinister than government 
awareness of the house you are in. Reasonable minds may dif-
fer, but to some even area surveillance will call to mind the 
monitoring of probationers and registered sex offenders rather 
than what any private person might casually observe.  
Moreover, this second point of distinction is at best tempo-
rary. Many phones now track GPS location.112 At least some 
providers apparently store this information.113 So if there is a 
constitutional distinction between government tracking of the 
 
 107. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 400.  
 108. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 109. See, e.g., Locke, supra note 101 (“Using cell tower triangulation (3 
towers), it is possible to determine a phone location to within an area of 
‘about’ ¾ square mile.”). 
 110. See, e.g., id. (“Some of the newest cell phones can actually report a 
GPS location, and this is quite accurate, and doesn’t rely on the cell towers at 
all.”). 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 350 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(“Unlike GPS data, the [district] court found, CSLI ‘can only reveal the general 
vicinity in which a cellular phone is used.’”). 
 112. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Rice, Police in My Pocket: The Need for Fourth 
Amendment Protection for Cellular Telephone Tracking, 38 CHAMPION 36, 37 
(2014) (“Smartphones receive signals from a constellation of GPS satellites 
roaming the skies. After the phone receives the signals, its GPS chip calcu-
lates the phone’s precise longitude and latitude, typically within 10 meters.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
 113. See id. (“The type of application software running on the phone dic-
tates whether the GPS location is sent to the network (or any other third par-
ty).” (footnote omitted)).  
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suspect’s neighborhood and his precise coordinates, that dis-
tinction will have a short shelf-life.  
The third line of distinction, then, may be the most im-
portant. The compelled disclosure of records by the communica-
tions provider inflicts no tangible injury on the suspect. The 
suspect cannot reasonably be ignorant that the provider keeps 
these records. A robust application of the assumption-of-risk or 
third-party doctrines would lead to permitting the government 
to exploit the service provider’s records without any judicial au-
thorization or antecedent suspicion. If it isn’t a “search” or a 
“seizure” the Fourth Amendment just doesn’t apply. The sus-
pect would have no right to complain even of a government 
theft by night of the provider’s records.  
There are, however, powerful reasons to doubt that the 
Court will follow the third-party doctrine to the bitter end. The 
bitter end would be ruling that content information in e-mails 
and text messages—all known by the suspect to be stored on 
the provider’s servers—can be accessed by government without 
warrant or even suspicion. The lower federal courts have re-
fused to go so far, however logical the application of Smith and 
Miller might be.114 The site tower cases may raise a lesser pri-
 
 114. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). In 
Warshak the defense moved to suppress stored e-mails, including content, ob-
tained by an order under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) for disclosure 
by the ISP of e-mails more than six months old supported by a showing of ar-
ticulable suspicion rather than probable cause. The Court held the SCA un-
constitutional insofar as it authorized compelled disclosure of e-mail content 
without a traditional warrant:  
If we accept that an email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is 
manifest that agents of the government cannot compel a commercial 
ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the 
Fourth Amendment. An ISP is the intermediary that makes email 
communication possible. Emails must pass through an ISP’s servers 
to reach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the functional 
equivalent of a post office or a telephone company. As we have dis-
cussed above, the police may not storm the post office and intercept a 
letter, and they are likewise forbidden from using the phone system to 
make a clandestine recording of a telephone call—unless they get a 
warrant, that is. It only stands to reason that, if government agents 
compel an ISP to surrender the contents of a subscriber’s emails, 
those agents have thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search, 
which necessitates compliance with the warrant requirement absent 
some exception. 
See id. at 286 (citations omitted).  
Warshak has become the leading case. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Genera-
tion Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 400 (2014) 
(“Warshak has been adopted by every court that has squarely decided the 
question. The case law is not entirely settled, as only one federal court of ap-
  
2016] TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE REGULATORY MODEL 1913 
 
vacy concern, but that privacy concern can be dismissed on 
grounds of the third-party doctrine only by inviting the gov-
ernment’s claim of a like right to access communications con-
tent stored by the provider.  
These non-trespass tracking cases illustrate the conver-
gence of a contemporary values approach to Katz and a histori-
cal approach. Both approaches lead to Professor Amsterdam’s 
conclusion: “[T]he analysis of these cases in terms of voluntary 
assumption of risk is wildly beside the point. The fact that our 
ordinary social intercourse, uncontrolled by government, impos-
es certain risks upon us hardly means that government is consti-
tutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks.”115 
From a contemporary perspective, government has different 
motives, and greater resources, than private parties. To share 
information even with dozens of private firms is different from 
sharing it with a government that might be just as interested in 
suppressing dissent, or catering to popular prejudice against 
outgroups, as in preventing and punishing crime.  
One plausible barometer of contemporary values is Califor-
nia’s new Electronic Communications Privacy Act.116 The Act re-
quires traditional warrants to obtain envelope, content, or loca-
tion data from providers.117 The state’s subpoena power over 
content, envelope, and location data applies to senders or recipi-
ents of the communication and owners of the digital devices in-
 
peals has squarely addressed the issue. But the trend in the case law is to rec-
ognize fairly broad Fourth Amendment protection, backed by a warrant re-
quirement, for stored contents such as emails.”). 
 115. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 406. Will Baude and James Stern recent-
ly have defended a “positive law model” of the threshold “search” category. 
William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth 
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2016) (arguing that courts 
should eschew the reasonable expectations of privacy analysis and instead 
“ask whether government officials have engaged in an investigative act that 
would be unlawful for a similarly situated private actor to perform”). Their ar-
ticle deserves more consideration than the constraints of space and time per-
mit here. I confine myself to observing that their model is not necessarily op-
posed to treating privacy as scalar or government as special. The government’s 
special responsibilities, and special dangers, might be accounted for under the 
rubric of reasonableness.   
 116. S.B. 178, 2015 Leg. (Cal. 2015), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/ 
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB178. 
 117. See id. § 1546.1(a) (“Except as provided in this section, a government 
entity shall not do any of the following: (1) Compel the production of or access 
to electronic communication information from a service provider. (2) Compel 
the production of or access to electronic information from any person or entity 
other than the authorized possessor of the device.”); see also id. § 1546.1(c) 
(authorizing discovery by, inter alia, wiretap order or search warrant).  
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volved.118 These “first parties” can respond to subpoenas by 
claiming Fifth Amendment privilege, which requires immuniz-
ing production and its fruits, including the content of the docu-
ments, unless the government can show that the government 
knew the existence and/or location of the documents with “rea-
sonable particularity”119 before the subpoena.  
Under the Act, the government can issue subpoenas to pro-
viders for subscriber information,120 but not for envelope, loca-
tion, or content information.121 With familiar exceptions for con-
sent122 and emergencies,123 the statute requires a particularized 
warrant to obtain provider records of message content, envelope 
information, and physical location data from anyone other than 
a sender, recipient, or owner of a device.124 In substance, the Act 
repudiates the third-party doctrine as it pertains to electronic 
communications devices.  
Not only was the Act adopted in the state with the largest, 
and an exceedingly diverse, population. Because the California 
Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of both houses of the 
legislature to pass any bill extending the exclusionary rule, the 
Act reflects a balance acceptable to a supermajority of this poli-
ty.125 Justice Sotomayor is very far from alone in believing the 
 
 118. Id. § 1546.1(i) (“This section does not limit the authority of a govern-
ment entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery sub-
poena to do any of the following: (1) Require an originator, addressee, or in-
tended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic 
communication information associated with that communication. (2) Require 
an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, di-
rectors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to 
disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic 
communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity. 
(3) Require a service provider to provide subscriber information.”). 
 119. See United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 322 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court understands the contents of the documents to be off-limits be-
cause they are a derivative use of the compelled testimony regarding the ex-
istence, location, and possession of the documents. As stated by this court in 
Hubbell: ‘If the government did not have a reasonably particular knowledge of 
subpoenaed documents’ actual existence, let alone their possession by the sub-
poenaed party, and cannot prove knowledge of their existence through any in-
dependent means, Kastigar forbids the derivative use of the information con-
tained therein against the immunized party.’” (citation omitted)).  
 120. S.B. 178 § 1546.2(i)(3).  
 121. Id. § 1546.1(a). 
 122. Id. § 1546.1(c)(3), (4). 
 123. Id. § 1546.1(h). 
 124. Id. § 1546.1(b). 
 125. Id. at pmbl. 
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third-party doctrine is due for reconsideration.126 Even if the fed-
eral courts decline to view a state statute as an index of social 
norms, the federal courts are likely to share the values behind a 
statute so widely supported.  
The historical test points in the same direction. Begin with 
the assumption-of-risk doctrine. The eighteenth-century house-
hold commonly included a floating cast of domestic servants, 
whether owned or hired. The servants could hide little from their 
masters, and the masters no more from the servants.  
Even at the apex of the social pyramid, the whole life of a 
Southern planter or a Northern merchant was to his valet an 
open book.127 Thomas Jefferson described the duties of his valet 
(first Jupiter, then Bob Hemings) as “to shave, dress, and follow 
me on horseback.”128 “Until Jefferson left for France in 1784, 
 
 126. Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the prem-
ise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”). Prefacing his defense of the doctrine, 
Orin Kerr admits: 
The third-party doctrine is the Fourth Amendment rule scholars love 
to hate. It is the Lochner of search and seizure law, widely criticized 
as profoundly misguided. Decisions applying the doctrine “top[] the 
chart of [the] most-criticized fourth amendment cases.” Wayne 
LaFave asserts in his influential treatise that the Court’s decisions 
applying it are “dead wrong” and “make[] a mockery of the Fourth 
Amendment.” The verdict among commentators has been frequent 
and apparently unanimous: The third-party doctrine is not only 
wrong, but horribly wrong. Even many state court judges have 
agreed. Over a dozen state Supreme Courts have rejected the doctrine 
under parallel provisions of their state constitutions. 
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
563–64 (2009) (footnotes omitted).  
 127. Aaron Wolfe described the relationships between enslaved body serv-
ants and their masters in colonial Williamsburg as follows:  
The valets and body servants and man and maid servants always 
shared a much more close relationship with their masters than those 
would have necessarily since those kinds of body servants would have 
slept at the foot of the masters bed. They would have helped them get 
dressed. They would have been privy to a lot more information about 
the master and the mistress. Not only from their conversations but 
from what they heard between each other, but what they heard about 
them. Because, you know, when Peyton Randolph would have had a 
sit down with Patrick Henry that their manservants would have been 
in that room and so they were privy to a lot more information than 
most enslaved folks would have been. 
Harsh World, This World, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG PAST & PRESENT POD-
CAST (Nov. 28, 2011), http://podcast.history.org/2011/11/28/harsh-world-this 
-world. 
 128. Biographic Entry on Robert Hemings, MONTICELLO, https://monticello 
.org/site/plantation-and-slavery/robert-hemings (last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
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Bob accompanied him everywhere.”129 It is said that Washing-
ton’s valet, Billy Lee, “perhaps knew George Washington as well 
as anyone could.”130 In a letter to Abigail, John Adams refer-
enced the quip that “no man is a hero to his wife or valet de 
chambre.”131 
The risk of indiscreet servants was widely recognized.132 Ben 
Franklin supposed his Paris valet to be a spy.133 Edward Ban-
croft, Franklin’s secretary in Paris, apparently really was a 
spy.134  
But these risks did not translate into a government right to 
the same information as economic and technological circum-
stances required sharing within the household. Just because a 
homeowner assumed the risk that gossiping (or testifying)135 
servants would disclose all that happened under the roof did not 
mean that the king’s men could break in and see what the serv-
ants already knew. The same men who lived with inescapable 
human monitors of uncertain loyalty risked their lives to throw 
off perceived abuses that prominently included writs of assis-
tance and general warrants. 
The founders had the same agent-relative view regarding 
the privacy of correspondence. In a pre-typewriter age, a promi-
nent citizen, or a successful business, would rely on amanuenses 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. Biographic Entry on Billy Lee, MOUNT VERNON, http://www 
.mountvernon.org/education/for-students/meet-people-from-the-past/billy-lee 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2016). 
 131. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Jan. 14, 1797), reprinted 
in LETTERS OF JOHN ADAMS AND OF MRS. ADAMS 240, 240–41 (Charles Francis 
Adams ed., 1841). 
 132. See J. JEAN HECHT, THE DOMESTIC SERVANT CLASS IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 81 (1956) (“Not the least harassing of these [annoyances 
on the part of masters] was the propensity of servants to retail their masters’ 
business.”); BRIDGET HILL, SERVANTS: ENGLISH DOMESTICS IN THE EIGHT-
EENTH CENTURY 91 (1996) (“If earlier employers had resented servants telling 
tales about the family to the outside world, now their concern about servants 
spying on them and gossiping became almost paranoid.”). 
 133. WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 336 
(2003).  
 134. See, e.g., THOMAS J. SCHAEPER, EDWARD BANCROFT: SCIENTIST, AU-
THOR, SPY xiv (2011).  
 135. Domestic servants sometimes brought, or testified in, suits against 
their masters. See THE EXPERIENCE OF DOMESTIC SERVICE FOR WOMEN IN 
EARLY MODERN LONDON (Paula Humphrey ed., 2011) (collecting depositions of 
servants in ecclesiastical courts); HECHT, supra note 132, at 79–80 (noting 
servants sued masters for excessive use of force). These are English sources, 
which, presumably, have some parallels with servants, but not slaves, in the 
colonies. Id. 
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to prepare much original outgoing correspondence and still more 
of the retained copies.136 The senders, moreover, would be work-
ing in similar social circumstances. Much of their correspondence 
also would have been exposed to scribes and couriers.  
The pre-Revolutionary postal service “was so slow and dear 
that no one used it if he could find other means of sending his 
letters.”137 It wasn’t private either. By 1775 British agents moni-
tored transatlantic correspondence and “it had become common 
knowledge for anyone writing transatlantic letters that they 
were without privacy.”138 Intra-American correspondence sent 
through the official post was equally insecure.139 Even for mun-
dane domestic correspondence sent through friends or servants, 
there simply was no way to send a letter without risk that it 
would be read, covertly, by someone other than the intended re-
cipient.140 Yet as soon as the colonists won independence and set 
up their own postal system, they guaranteed by law the privacy 
of letters transmitted through it.141 Risks are relative, and the 
substantial danger to the privacy of correspondence posed by 
 
 136. See, e.g., W.T. BAXTER, THE HOUSE OF HANCOCK: BUSINESS IN BOSTON 
195 (1964) (“In addition to his store, Thomas [Hancock] had a ‘compting room.’ 
When he grew rich, the routine work of this office was put into the hands of 
clerks (though John at one point complains, ‘Am reduced at the last Moment 
to write my own Letters’”(footnote omitted)); id. (outgoing mail was roughly 
drafted by Thomas or John, then “a clerk would make a fair copy for dis-
patch”); id. at 196 (“In the case of foreign letters, a copy was also made in the 
letter book.”). 
 137. Id. at 197.  
 138. KONSTANTIN DIERKS, IN MY POWER: LETTER WRITING AND COMMUNI-
CATIONS IN EARLY AMERICA 215 (2009).  
 139. See Amy C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and 
the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 564 (“In short, by 
1773, the Americans clearly worried, and had good reason to worry, that loyal-
ist postmasters would intercept and read their letters, a frightening prospect 
when much of what they were doing likely constituted treason.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
 140. See Cathy Hellier, Physical, Intellectual, Biographical: Our Ideas of 
Privacy and Their Evolution (2012), http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/ 
winter13/privacy.cfm?showSite=mobile (last visited Apr. 2, 2016). 
Sending a letter raised colonial Americans’ concerns about privacy. 
The safest conveyance was usually a friend or relation, but everyone 
knew it was possible to open a letter by carefully pulling up the wax 
seal. A busybody could quickly heat the back of the seal enough to 
melt the wax a bit and then reseal the letter discreetly. 
Id.  
 141. See Desai, supra note 139, at 565–66 (explaining that the Continental 
Congress, in 1782, required warrants to open letters, and the first U.S. Con-
gress did likewise in 1792).  
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private parties was not to be aggravated by allowing the gov-
ernment an equal right to pry.  
The third-party doctrine departs slightly from the assump-
tion-of-risk doctrine. In the assumption-of-risk cases government 
agents collect information directly from the suspect that private 
snoops might have obtained by similar methods.142 When, how-
ever, the suspect voluntarily provides information to a third par-
ty—typically but not necessarily a business from which the sus-
pect buys goods or services—the government can obtain the 
suspect’s information from the third party rather than directly 
from the suspect.  
When the government subpoenas the provider’s records to 
reconstruct the suspect’s location, the government acquires in-
formation that a private party not only could have, but did, col-
lect, with the consent of the suspect. To the extent the consumer 
has no way to opt-out of sharing with the government what she 
shares with the provider, the data collected are indistinguishable 
from the government acquiring location data directly by using a 
site simulator to collect the signals directly. The threat to priva-
cy is larger, however, because the cost (to the government) of col-
lecting the information is negligible. The provider has the data, a 
computer can do the triangulation, and only a court order based 
on Terry-type suspicion is required even if the provider refuses to 
cooperate with law enforcement. 
The opinions in Smith and Miller say nothing about the his-
tory of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, they simply plugged 
pro-government values into the normative Katz test. For Justice 
Powell, author of Miller, permitting the government to inspect at 
will records the government requires banks to keep of consumer 
transactions was not “destructive”—to quote Professor Amster-
dam—of any “interests of privacy and security that are indispen-
sable to a free society.”143 In that age of interest-balancing, none 
of the Justices asked how the founders would have thought 
about the case.  
The only search warrant allowed by common law was the 
warrant for stolen goods. Warrants for papers were condemned 
unequivocally.144 A warrant for papers possessed by A for use in 
 
 142. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that po-
lice combing through garbage that a suspect left outside the home for collec-
tion was not a search).  
 143. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 409.  
 144. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 807–08; see Donald A. 
Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Pa-
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the prosecution of B was as void as any other warrant for papers. 
It is true that if, say, John Entick’s papers showed evidence of 
crimes by someone else, say the printer John Almon, only 
Entick, and not Almon, could recover damages. The likely dam-
ages, however, were so substantial that Entick’s secrets would 
have been as safe against seizure under warrant in Almon’s 
hands as in his own. In the founding era, the risk against crimi-
nal discovery of papers entrusted to a third party was betrayal 
by the third party, not government seizure. 
What about subpoenas? In civil litigation, the parties could 
sue in equity to compel disclosure of books and papers.145 There 
was no parallel action in criminal cases, on the ground that equi-
ty would never enforce a penalty or a forfeiture.146 In criminal 
cases the common law refused to enforce any subpoena for the 
papers of the target of the investigation.147 Any number of peo-
ple—secretaries, clerks, couriers, domestic servants—might have 
 
pers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
49 (2013); Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 
VA. L. REV. 869 (1985). 
 145. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 
§ 1485, at 1017 (W.E. Grigsby ed., 1884) (“Another defect of a similar nature 
was the want of a power in the courts of common law to compel the production 
of deeds, books, writings, and other things, which are in the custody or power 
of one of the parties, and were material to the right, title, or defence of the 
other.”). Blackstone criticized this cumbersome procedure. See 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382–83. The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized 
federal courts hearing common law cases to compel discovery of books and pa-
pers on the same terms as chancery. Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 15 (1789); 
see also Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Dis-
covery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 23–25 (1988) (describing how American states 
originally followed English civil discovery practice, which was cumbersome 
and limited).  
 146. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 145, § 1494, at 1021 (“[C]ourts of equity 
will not allow discovery in aid . . . of a criminal prosecution; or of a penal ac-
tion; or of a suit in its nature partaking of such a character; or in a case involv-
ing moral turpitude; for it is against the genius of the common law to compel a 
party to accuse himself; and it is against the general principles of equity to aid 
in the enforcement of penalties or forfeitures.”). 
 147. See Rex v. Cornelius (1744) 93 Eng. Rep. 1133, 1134; Regina v. Mead 
(1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 119; Rex v. Worsenham (1701) 91 Eng. Rep. 1370; see also 
Roe v. Harvey (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 302, 305; King v. Heydon (1762) 96 Eng. 
Rep. 195 (K.B.); Rex v. Purnell (1748) 96 Eng. Rep. 20. For a review of the 
English cases decided before American independence, see Richard A. 
Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be a Witness” and the Resurrection of Boyd, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1620–23 (1999); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRI-
VACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 145 (2007) (explaining the constitutional law governing first-
party and third-party subpoenas). 
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read the papers. A subpoena in the name of the King was none-
theless unenforceable.  
The common-law rule against target subpoenas in criminal 
cases might, or might not, have extended to third-party subpoe-
nas. Given the extreme Whig antagonism to warrants for papers, 
it seems unlikely that a subpoena doing the same work as a war-
rant would be regarded differently. A warrant for third-party 
papers was as void as one for first-party records, and the officers 
just as liable in trespass in the former as in the latter case. The 
rule against target subpoenas in criminal cases, however, was 
related to the privilege against self-incrimination and the testi-
monial incapacity of defendants at trial. So we can speculate 
that Founding-era common law did, or did not, include security 
against third-party subpoenas. The evidence we have does not 
foreclose either speculation.  
The King v. Purnell was the leading pre-independence Eng-
lish precedent refusing to order production of documents in a 
criminal case.148 Purnell was Vice Chancellor of Oxford. In that 
capacity he had disciplined some students who, under the influ-
ence of alcohol, had praised James Stuart, the pretender to the 
Crown worn by George II.149 A supporter of King George, the 
Reverend Bracow, confronted these students, and the ensuring 
fracas was broken up by the arrival of the University Proctor.  
Bracow then demanded that Purnell punish the students. 
Purnell wrote the incident off as “young fellows getting in liquor” 
and delayed the offenders’ degrees for one year.150 Bracow de-
manded expulsion and Purnell refused. A criminal prosecution of 
the students for “drinking the health of the Pretender” followed, 
and the seditious students were sentenced, inter alia, to two 
years in prison.151  
The King’s Attorney General filed an information against 
Purnell, charging dereliction of his duties as Vice Chancellor and 
as a justice of the peace.152 Before trial, the Crown sought an or-
der “directed to the proper officers of the university to permit 
their books, records and archives to be inspected, in order to 
 
 148. Subsequent references are to the longer report of the decision, Purnell, 
96 Eng. Rep. at 20, which is taken from Blackstone’s Reports.  
 149. The fullest account of the brouhaha can be found in GEORGE 
BIRKBECK HILL, DR. JOHNSON: HIS FRIENDS AND HIS CRITICS 68–72 (1878).  
 150. See id. at 70–71. Purnell added to the one-year suspensions an as-
signment to prepare a translation in Latin. Id.  
 151. See HILL, supra note 149, at 71–72.  
 152. See Purnell, 96 Eng. Rep. at 20.  
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furnish evidence against the vice chancellor.”153 Apparently the 
University statutes required the Vice Chancellor to expel the of-
fenders.154 So the order sought by the Crown would have re-
quired Purnell, in his official capacity, to produce documents ut-
tered in the distant past. These might incriminate him by 
proving the duty he was accused of neglecting, but they included 
no factual assertions by anyone.  
Attorneys for the prosecution argued that since the docu-
ments could not incriminate the University, Purnell could be or-
dered to produce them.155 The court rejected this argument, but 
said nothing about a subpoena to a person other than the target 
of the prosecution, to produce documents uttered by the target 
and entrusted to the third party. Blackstone’s report includes a 
note suggesting that the prosecutors could easily have obtained 
the statutes; for example, the University archivist in “whose 
keeping the original is, might have been compelled to have at-
tended with it at the trial.”156 But this again is not on point, for 
the archivist did not obtain the statutes from Purnell.  
Purnell and similar cases provide historical support for the 
Fifth Amendment act-of-production doctrine, but shed little if 
any light on the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine. The 
common law clearly provided that the protection provided to 
the target by the Purnell line of cases was not lost when the 
documents were entrusted to an attorney for the purpose of ob-
taining professional advice.157 Cases decided on the basis of pro-
fessional privilege, however, do not speak to the limits of the 
power to compel production of unprivileged communications.  
 
 153. Id. 
 154. One of the students, Luxmore, fled from the scene, defying the 
Proctor’s formal order to stay, “siste per fidem.” HILL, supra note 149, at 70 
n.2. The university statutes provided expulsion for this delict. Id. 
 155. See Purnell, 96 Eng. Rep. at 22 (“It is not desired that the vice-
chancellor but the public officer should produce them: should he prove to be 
the public officer, that is no reason against the motion; for it does not respect 
him as defendant, but as public officer.” (argument of Attorney General Ry-
der)); id. at 23 (“The university is not accused; the university may therefore 
very safely produce their books.” (argument of R. Lloyd for the Crown)). 
 156. Id. at 23. The note suggests that, given the various different ways the 
university statutes might have been obtained, the motion to compel was “an 
excuse for dropping a prosecution, which could not be maintained: and it was 
accordingly dropped immediately after, having cost the defendant to the 
amount of several hundred pounds.” Id.  
 157. See, e.g., Rex v. Dixon (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1047. In Dixon, Peach, a 
suspected forger, left papers with his attorney, Dixon. A grand jury issued a 
subpoena to Dixon, and the court ruled that Dixon could not be compelled to 
surrender the papers. Id. at 1047–48.  
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There is one instance of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum 
in a criminal investigation served on a third party for books or 
papers before the advent of the telegraph in the middle the nine-
teenth century. John Marshall, presiding over the circuit court 
hearing the treason prosecution of Aaron Burr, famously issued 
a subpoena to President Jefferson, directing the President to 
turn over a letter from General Wilkinson accusing Burr.158 Note, 
however, that Wilkinson really did intend to deliver his letter to 
the government as distinct from, say, a lawyer. Note also that it 
was the defense, not the government, Marshall saw as entitled to 
discovery of documents already in the hands of the government.  
The common-law rule regarding subpoenas for documents 
held by third parties entrusted with information from the target 
is therefore unknown and perhaps unknowable.159 The very pau-
city of sources, however, suggest that even were a third-party 
subpoena enforceable as a matter of law, prosecutors were not 
seeking third-party documents on a routine basis. It follows that 
the risk of government-compelled disclosure of confidences held 
by third parties was not a risk to which the founding generation 
would have adverted. 
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court declared in Ex parte 
Jackson that postal inspectors could not open mail without a 
warrant.160 At the same time, lower federal courts enforced grand 
jury subpoenas to Western Union officials for specific telegrams 
in support of criminal investigations.161 The telegraph cases were 
 
 158. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).  
 159. The telegraph cases from the late nineteenth century cite no prece-
dents for third-party subpoenas in criminal cases. The probable explanation is 
that there were no such precedents because prosecutors did not seek third-
party subpoenas until the telegraph cases themselves.  
 160. 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (“Letters, and sealed packages subject to letter 
postage, in the mail can be opened and examined only under like warrant, is-
sued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be 
seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own house-
hold. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in 
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their pa-
pers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.”). Jackson chal-
lenged his conviction for violating a federal statute prohibiting sending lottery 
materials through the mail. The Court rejected his challenges to the constitu-
tionality of the statute but went out of its way to announce the warrant re-
quirement for mail. Perceived excesses in enforcing anti-pornography laws 
may have motivated this move. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, America’s First 
Wiretapping Controversy in Context and as Context, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 
214–15 (2011).  
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 
1876).  
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thought to be different from sealed envelopes committed to the 
post.162 Boyd, after it came down, was distinguished because the 
investigation focused on “the conduct of the parties who sent or 
received the telegrams, and not the relation of the telegraph 
company to the alleged violations of law involved in the act of 
transmitting the telegrams between the parties.”163  
The telegram cases announce the third-party doctrine 
much in its modern form. There are two reasons, however, to 
discount them as authority for the modern doctrine. First, in 
context, the nineteenth-century telegram cases actually operat-
ed very much like a particularized warrant. From the perspec-
tive of current law, it is difficult to perceive an important but 
counterintuitive detail—the government’s inability to obtain a 
search warrant for typical telegrams. In Jackson the mail at is-
sue had contained an illegal solicitation to buy lottery chances 
and so was contraband (just as was obscenity, the other major 
object of nineteenth century postal inspectors).164 Ergo the 
Court’s recognition that the mail might be opened with a war-
rant is, in context, in no conflict with Boyd’s latter pronounce-
ment that warrants for papers of evidentiary value only were 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.  
Telegrams were different. Some might be instrumentalities 
of crime, i.e., co-conspirator statements. After Boyd the Su-
preme Court went to extremes to characterize papers found at 
the crime scene as instrumentalities.165 Even so, certainly 
many, and probably most, telegrams of interest to the govern-
ment would be non-criminal communications, “mere evidence.” 
 
 162. See Desai, supra note 139, at 583: 
In short, at the very time at which the Court determined that the 
Fourth Amendment prevented the government from opening sealed 
letters in Ex parte Jackson, other courts were explicitly rejecting chal-
lenges to subpoenas for telegrams, challenges that were based on 
analogizing the two communications media. Ex parte Jackson can 
thus best be seen as implicitly recognizing specific institutional at-
tributes of the post office.  
 163. In re Storror, 63 F. 564, 566 (N.D. Cal. 1894).  
 164. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 736–37. 
 165. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). Prohibition agents 
executed a warrant to raid a speakeasy. The warrant did not authorize any 
seizure of papers, criminal or otherwise. The agents seized business ledgers 
and utility bills linking one of the defendants to the business. The Court’s 
holding that the business ledger, equivalent to a modern drug dealer’s pay-owe 
sheets, were forfeitable instrumentalities seems sensible. Including the utility 
bills seems a long reach, although presumably operating a saloon without heat 
or light would be more difficult than otherwise. Id. at 193–94, 199. 
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For example, a telegram might contradict a defendant’s later 
claim of alibi.  
So no court would issue a warrant to seize a sender’s copy 
of a letter (or a telegram) or the recipient’s delivered copy of a 
letter (or a telegram). Issuing a subpoena, in a criminal case, to 
the sender or recipient was barred by the common law (and, 
under Boyd, by the Constitution). Unlike mail, however, the 
telegraph positively required human operators to access and ad-
vert to the content of the message.166 Western Union, unlike the 
post office, retained copies for business purposes. It followed that 
the third-party subpoena offered an end-run around the ancient 
rule against warrants for papers.  
Today the inflexible ban on warrants for papers is behind 
us.167 We have an option the nineteenth-century judges did not, 
i.e., to permit government access to third-party records subject to 
procedural safeguards for the consumer as well as the service 
provider. Indeed the nineteenth-century telegram cases went 
down this path a considerable distance. To be enforceable 
against Western Union, the subpoena had to be as particular as 
the circumstances permitted.168 The telegram cases suggest judg-
es going as close to approving a particularized warrant for pa-
pers as they could without running afoul of Entick and Boyd.169 
 
 166. See, e.g., DAVID HOCHFELDER, THE TELEGRAPH IN AMERICA 1832–
1920, at 177 (2012) (“[T]elegrams were mediated forms of communication, re-
quiring sending and receiving operators and messengers for delivery . . . . this 
structure [made] secrecy and dialogue difficult.”).  
 167. See Andressen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (equating evidentiary 
documents with evidentiary chattels); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (authorizing 
seizures of documents and computer files).  
 168. See, e.g., Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 94 (1880) (the “spirit” of Missouri 
constitution’s search and seizure provision requires that subpoena for papers 
“shall at least give a reasonably accurate description of the paper wanted, ei-
ther by its date, title, substance or the subject it relates to”); id (“To permit an 
indiscriminate search among all the papers in one’s possession for no particu-
lar paper, but some paper, which may throw some light on some issue involved 
in the trial of some cause pending, would lead to consequences that can be con-
templated only with horror, and such a process is not to be tolerated among a 
free people.”); see also In re Storror, 63 F. at 568 (“The subpoena now under 
consideration calls for the production of telegrams, describing them with such 
particularity as appears to be practicable; and, under all the circumstances, I 
think they are sufficiently described to indicate, to an ordinarily intelligent 
person, the particular communications required.”); Oliver, supra note 160, at 
230 (“Courts across the country began to require the sort of specificity for tele-
gram subpoenas required in Missouri.” (footnote omitted)).  
 169. See, e.g., In re Storror, 63 F. at 568 (“[T]he telegraphic messages were 
probably the effective means of carrying out their [the target’s] unlawful pur-
poses.”). Note Judge Morrow’s characterization of the telegrams as “probably” 
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That doesn’t translate into a Fourth Amendment regime with no 
limits on third-party subpoenas.  
The second point about the telegram cases is related to the 
first. Those cases were seen for what they were, i.e., authorizing 
the functional equivalent of warrants for papers, by formidable 
critics. Chief among these was Judge Cooley, who gave this nas-
cent third-party doctrine both barrels in his treatise on the Con-
stitutional Limitations.170 Cooley dismissed the telegraph opera-
tor’s access to content as an undesired necessity;171 saw no 
distinction between opening mail and disclosing telegrams;172 nor 
(anticipating Boyd) any distinction between warrants and sub-
poenas, including, Judge Cooley said, third-party subpoenas.173 
In 1880, the House Committee on Revision of the Laws intro-
duced a bill that would have “secure[d] to telegrams the same 
sanctity as now protects letters by mail.”174 The bill never 
 
instrumentalities, which could be seized under warrant even under Boyd.  
 170. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
372–73 n.2 (5th ed. 1883).  
 171. Id. at 373 n.2: 
[The telegraph] is used as a means of correspondence, and as a valua-
ble, and in many cases, indispensable, substitute for the postal facili-
ties; and the communication is made, not because the party desires to 
put the operator in possession of facts, but because transmission 
without it is impossible. It is not voluntary in any other sense than 
this, that the party makes it rather than deprive himself of the bene-
fits of this great invention and improvement. 
 172. Id.: 
[W]hat good reason can be given why the postmaster should not be 
made subject to the process of subpoena for a like purpose, and com-
pelled to bring the correspondence which passes through his hands 
into court, and open it for the purposes of evidence? 
 173. Id. Were it not for the decided cases, Judge Cooley thought:  
[T]he public could not be entitled to a man’s private correspondence, 
whether obtainable by seizing it in the mails, or by compelling the op-
erator of the telegraph to testify to it, or by requiring his servants to 
take from his desks his private letters and journals, and bring them 
into court on subpoena duces tecum. Any such compulsory process to 
obtain it seems a most arbitrary and unjustifiable seizure of private 
papers; such an “unreasonable seizure” as directly condemned by the 
Constitution. 
Id. 
 174. See H.R. REP. NO. 1262, at 1 (1880). According to a press account, the 
proposed legislation provided: 
Section 1. That all telegraph messages delivered to any telegraph 
company availing itself of Title 65 of the Revised Statutes and copies 
thereof made by such company at the place of destination, or at any 
intermediate point, shall be deemed to be private papers of the send-
ers and receivers of such messages, and shall be protected from un-
reasonable search and seizure, and from production as evidence in in-
dividual and legislative proceedings to the same extent as letters sent 
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passed, but the Committee recommendation shows it had con-
siderable support. Whether to embrace the telegram cases (none 
decided by the Supreme Court), or their critics, is, as Professor 
Amsterdam foresaw, a normative choice rather than a doctrinal 
inevitability.  
So the modern third-party doctrine, by denying any Fourth 
Amendment protection to consumers, goes beyond permitting 
warrants for papers, which was the functional objective of the 
judges deciding the telegram cases. In any event, there seems 
very little normative distinction between mail and telegrams. 
The sanctity of the former, like the vulnerability of the latter, 
was the product of a normative judgment from which some 
thoughtful jurists forcefully disagreed.  
Return now to the cell phone site tower cases. From a nor-
mative perspective of the sort defended by Professor Amsterdam, 
the issue is whether government access to pervasive physical lo-
cation data on less than a particularized warrant is a risk that 
law-abiding citizens ought to assume when they rely on technol-
ogy that is practically indispensable in social life. From an 
originalist perspective like Justice Scalia’s test in Kyllo and 
Jones, a perspective rightly abstracted from specific founding-era 
practices, the question is whether routine government access to 
pervasive physical location data is consistent with the privacy 
expected by a generation that rebelled against a government 
that resorted to writs of assistance and general warrants. Query, 
at the end of the day, how different might be the answers flesh-
and-blood judges give to these two questions?  
IV.  WINDS OF CHANGE: RULES AND REASONABLENESS   
A. RULES VERSUS STANDARDS: GANT AND RILEY  
Just as the Court generally followed Professor Amsterdam’s 
focus on contemporary norms in assessing the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court generally has articulated the doc-
 
by the United States mail. 
H.R. 5101, 46th Cong. (1880), reprinted in Inviolability of Telegrams, N.Y. 
DAILY TRIB., Jan. 11, 1880, at 5. Title 65 granted telegraph companies the 
right to run wires on public lands. The bill therefore covered Western Union, 
which by that time was virtually a monopolist.  
The reference to “private papers” makes the nineteenth century dilemma 
clear. The common law, reinforced by the Fourth Amendment, prohibited any 
warrant for papers that were not stolen or contraband. The sponsors of the bill 
wanted to bring telegrams within the ambit of this prohibition, while the judg-
es enforcing subpoenas for telegrams wanted to avoid this result.  
  
2016] TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE REGULATORY MODEL 1927 
 
trinal content of the Fourth Amendment in terms of rules rather 
than standards. Some recent departures from the model of rules 
are more superficial than substantial.  
The central topic of the Fourth Amendment rules-and-
standards debate has been the doctrine of search incident to ar-
rest. Founding-era common law dealt extensively, albeit uncer-
tainly, with the legality of warrantless arrests. It shed no light 
on incidental search power, and pre-Mapp cases by turns forbade 
and permitted extensive search of private premises incident to 
arrest.175  
After Mapp, search-incident doctrine became about ten 
times as important as before, because it practically operated on 
about ten times as many arrests as before. Professor Amsterdam 
was joined by Professor LaFave176 in calling for the Court to set 
clear rules for the practice. The Court had begun to do that, first 
by authorizing the thorough search of the person, including all 
personal effects, in all cases of lawful arrest.177 It then authorized 
a similar thorough search of the passenger compartment of an 
arrested motorist’s vehicle, including any effects inside.178 The 
police enjoyed this search-incident power even when the facts of 
the particular case suggested no risk of armed resistance or loss 
of evidence of the crime of arrest.  
The new millennium opened with a display of extreme devo-
tion to the need for rules. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista179 the 
majority upheld arrest, transport to the station, booking, and 
post-arrest detention for the offense of not buckling Atwater’s 
children into their seatbelts. No jail time was authorized for pun-
ishment of the offense. Nonetheless the Court, troubled by the 
indeterminacy of the exceptions that would have accompanied a 
 
 175. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (authorizing 
search incident to arrest of premises under control of suspect at time of ar-
rest); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 669 (1948) (prohibiting search of a 
home incident to arrest absent exigent circumstances preventing application 
for a search warrant); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (upholding 
an extensive home search incident to arrest, without a search warrant); Go-
Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (holding police 
search of safe or desk drawers incident to arrest unconstitutional absent 
search warrant); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (allowing 
search of business following arrest at home). 
 176. See Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Stand-
ardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 S. CT. REV. 127 (arguing a 
prohibition must be clear and avoid too much flexibility).  
 177. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973). 
 178. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 179. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).  
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no-jail, no-arrest rule, held the warrantless arrest not “unrea-
sonable.”180  
The rule authorizing arrest for non-jailable misdemeanors, 
like the rules authorizing thorough search of person and vehicles 
incident to arrest, was not itself without plausible justification. 
The combination of these rules, together with the doctrine of 
Whren v. United States181 that otherwise lawful traffic enforce-
ment is not made unconstitutional by a subjective motive to 
search for illegal drugs, was intolerable.182 If it was not indeed 
intolerable, it was not long tolerated.  
In two recent cases the Court curtailed the search-incident 
power. Arizona v. Gant cut back on the Belton rule by holding 
that once the suspect has been physically restrained, further 
search of the vehicle requires specific facts suggesting Terry-type 
suspicion to seek evidence of the crime of arrest.183 In Riley v. 
California,184 the Court qualified Robinson by holding that when 
police seize cell phones incident to arrest any search of the in-
formation stored on the phone amounts to an intrusion on a sep-
arate enclave of privacy.185 Absent exigent circumstances, the po-
 
 180. See id. at 347: 
But we have traditionally recognized that a responsible Fourth 
Amendment balance is not well served by standards requiring sensi-
tive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest every dis-
cretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for con-
stitutional review. . . . Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to 
be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object 
in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards 
sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of sur-
viving judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or 
search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth 
Amendment balance thus credit the government’s side with an essen-
tial interest in readily administrable rules.  
(citations omitted) (footnote omitted).  
 181. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).  
 182. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 5, at 393–94 (characterizing Whren, Bel-
ton and Atwater as the Supreme Court’s “iron triangle”).  
 183. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 355 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
Court adopts a new two-part rule under which a police officer who arrests a 
vehicle occupant or recent occupant may search the passenger compartment if 
(1) the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle at the time of the 
search or (2) the officer has reason to believe that the vehicle contains evi-
dence of the offense of arrest.”).  
 184. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
 185. Id. at 2495 (“The fact that technology now allows an individual to car-
ry such information in his hand does not make the information any less wor-
thy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the ques-
tion of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an 
arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”). 
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lice need to obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone found 
on the suspect or in the suspect’s vehicle after arrest.  
These developments suggest the maturation of a rule-based 
regime rather than a systemic reversion to general standards. 
The combination of Atwater, Whren, and Belton called for some 
sort of recalibration. Any system of court-made rules will gener-
ate this sort of synergy. It follows that a commitment to rules 
implies a commitment to revisiting those rules in light not just of 
technological changes, like cell phones, but of the evolution of 
constitutional doctrine itself.  
Riley illustrates the necessarily dynamic character of a rule-
based regime. Digital technology meant that the Robinson and 
Belton rules empowered the police to invade a much larger 
sphere of private life than before. The Court’s response was not 
to fall back on a general standard. Chief Justice Roberts’s major-
ity opinion explicitly rejected the government’s appeal to adopt 
the Gant standard for searching phones without warrants based 
on Terry-type suspicion to find evidence of the crime of arrest.186  
Riley notably did not disturb the Robinson and Belton rules 
for intimate but non-digital personal effects.187 Incident to arrest 
the police may search papers found on the suspect’s person.188 
They need to obtain a warrant to search a cell phone, even 
though the information on the phone may be less private in a 
given case. The Robinson rule remains under-inclusive of priva-
cy, and over-inclusive of law-enforcement, interests. The Riley 
rule is over- and under-inclusive in the opposite way. Both, how-
ever, are rules rather than standards.  
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT REMEDIES  
The bright-line-rule regime clearly reflects the regulatory 
perspective defended by Perspectives. The Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence of Fourth Amendment remedies has worked from 
the same regulatory perspective, at least half-way. The Court 
repeatedly has held that the police may violate the Fourth 
Amendment without triggering either the exclusionary rule or 
liability for damages.189 The Court has done so out of fear that 
 
 186. Id. at 2492 (“At any rate, a Gant standard would prove no practical 
limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches.”). 
 187. See id. at 2484 (“Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate 
balance in the context of physical objects . . . .”).  
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 995 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1993) (up-
holding seizure and copying of an address book incident to arrest).  
 189. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986); United States v. 
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penalizing the police for illegal but border-line actions would in-
hibit lawful police actions in future cases.  
The long line of cases recognizing good-faith-reliance excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule is one manifestation of the regula-
tory perspective. The judge-made doctrine of qualified immunity 
for actions brought under section 1983 or Bivens is another. If 
Fourth Amendment remedies were about restoring the atomistic 
spheres of privacy and autonomy violated by unreasonable 
searches and arrests, the police would not be given these free 
passes.  
Now the Court has indeed applied the regulatory perspec-
tive in a way that suggests hostility to Fourth Amendment 
rights rather than concern for vigorous action consistent with 
that Amendment in future cases. The rejection of target standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule is an obvious case in point.190 At 
least so far as the public reasoning of the opinions goes, however, 
the Court’s remedial jurisprudence reflects regulatory rather 
than atomistic values.191  
This is not likely to change so long as the substantive law is 
articulated as an evolving body of judge-made rules. If the body 
of Fourth Amendment rules needs both to provide guidance to 
police and lower courts, and to evolve in light of technological 
changes and the interaction of the various rules themselves, the 
Court must be willing to modify the rules on a regular basis. 
Gant and Riley are illustrative.  
So the ruling in Davis v. United States192 extending the good-
faith-reliance exception to the exclusionary rule to police reliance 
on local court precedent, reflects this need for ongoing reevalua-
tion of substantive doctrine. If a pro-defense change in doctrine, 
like the Gant decision, undid the convictions of a great many 
guilty criminals secured by police compliance with the then-
prevailing bright-line rules, there would be considerable reluc-
tance among the Justices to decide the next case, say, Riley, in 
favor of the defense.  
 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).  
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77 (1993) (per curiam) (re-
jecting the doctrine of co-conspirator standing).  
 191. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3 (1978) (“The necessity 
for a showing of a violation of personal rights is not obviated by recognizing 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.”).  
 192. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).  
  
2016] TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE REGULATORY MODEL 1931 
 
The troubling feature of Davis is not denying the individual 
defendant the benefit of exclusion.193 From the regulatory per-
spective the exclusion of the evidence found in Gant’s car is, as to 
Gant, an arbitrary windfall justified by future consequences. The 
trouble is ensuring a stream of genuine cases-and-controversies 
to enable the Supreme Court to monitor the substantive law.  
The search in Riley took place before the California Supreme 
Court ruled that there was no cell-phone exception to Robinson 
and Belton.194 The companion case, Wurie, was one of first im-
pression in the First Circuit Court of Appeals.195 The open ques-
tion is whether Davis, over time, will make such cases so hard to 
find that the law ossifies. The regulatory perspective ultimately 
calls for permitting the Court to change Fourth Amendment law 
prospectively. Whether the Court can find a legitimate way to 
reverse the conviction before it, but not others still pending on 
direct review, remains to be seen.  
In one context the Court has flatly refused to follow the reg-
ulatory perspective. When police perform a protective search for 
weapons under Terry, and coincidentally find illegal drugs, the 
Court has approved receiving the evidence under the “plain feel” 
doctrine.196 Perspectives logically argued that the fruits of at least 
some lawful searches should be excluded to discourage unlawful 
searches in future cases.197 While the Court has accepted this log-
ic when it involves admitting evidence illegally seized, it has re-
jected it in the parallel context of lawful examples of practices 
likely to be unlawful in many other instances.  
This final bulwark of the atomistic perspective has been un-
dermined, not by the Supreme Court, but by federal district 
courts issuing institutional reform injunctions against urban po-
lice departments. The Rodney King law authorizes the Justice 
Department to sue departments characterized by a “pattern or 
 
 193. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1080–81 (2011) (“The exclusionary rule for 
changing law is critical to the development of Fourth Amendment law, and its 
costs are relatively modest.”).  
 194. See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting the cell phone 
exception to search incident to arrest authority); People v. Riley, No. D059840, 
2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013) (stop and search took place on 
August 22, 2009).  
 195. See Wurie v. United States, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (the gov-
ernment did not raise the good-faith exception in district court, and this “is not 
a case in which an intervening change in the law made the good-faith excep-
tion relevant only after the district court issued its opinion”). 
 196. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 197. See Perspectives, supra note 1.  
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practice” of constitutional violations, and to obtain injunctive re-
lief to remedy the “pattern or practice.”198  
The effect of these consent decrees is to outlaw police actions 
that of themselves do not violate the Fourth Amendment. For 
example, nothing in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence re-
quires police to file reports of Terry stops, or maintain a 24/7 re-
ception line for complaints of police misconduct, or to wear body 
cameras, or to cooperate with an independent monitor. Consent 
decrees may include any of these requirements as a way to pre-
vent constitutional violations in other cases.199  
Civil-rights insiders may trivialize these consent decrees as 
exotic interventions by a DOJ office with far fewer resources 
than there are lawless police departments. There is some truth 
to this characterization.200 It is eye-opening, however, that Pro-
fessor Stephen Rushin has estimated that the departments that 
have been subjects of a formal DOJ investigation under § 14141 
serve and protect twenty percent of the country’s entire popula-
tion.201  
Moreover, suits by the Justice Department now are being 
supplemented by private class actions. The Floyd litigation add-
 
 198. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).  
 199. See, e.g., United States v. City of Detroit, No. 03-72258, ¶ 45 (E.D. 
Mich. June 12, 2003) (“The DPD shall require written documentation of all in-
vestigatory stops and frisks by the end of the shift in which the police action 
occurred. The DPD shall review all investigatory stops and frisks and docu-
ment on an auditable form those unsupported by reasonable suspicion within 
24 hours of receiving the officer’s report.”); Summary of Remedial Opinion and 
Order in Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, CTR. FOR CONSTITUT. RTS., http:// 
www.ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/Remedy%20Decision% 
20Summary%20-%20Final.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (in a private class 
action suit against NYPD, a remedial order includes an independent monitor 
and police body-camera pilot program).  
 200. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proac-
tive Policing Reforms, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2009): 
Although public information available about the Justice Department’s 
§ 14141 enforcement practice so far is incomplete, there have been at 
least thirty-three § 14141 full investigations of police departments: 
seven of these investigations resulted in a consent decree filed in fed-
eral court, seven more resulted in a memorandum of agreement be-
tween the United States and the police department, and twelve inves-
tigated departments received only a technical assistance or 
investigative findings letter from the Justice Department. The other 
seven did not result in any public action. 
(footnote omitted).  
 201. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police De-
partments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347–48 (2015) (“Today, nearly one in five 
Americans is served by a law enforcement agency that has been subject to a 
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation via § 14141.” (footnote omitted)).  
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ed the population of the five boroughs to the number whose local 
department is under a federal court consent decree.202 The 
Melendres suit adds the Maricopa County Sheriff’s office.203  
These consent decrees implement the regulatory perspective 
a l’outrance. The police department itself is intimately involved 
in preparing the decree, with the opportunity to present its case 
to DOJ under § 14141204 or to the court in a citizen’s class action. 
The output is not precisely what Professor Amsterdam proposed, 
but the actual function of modern institutional reform litigation 
is very similar to the police rule-making he envisioned.  
The early returns are positive. The empirical evidence that 
is now available and continues to be gathered suggests that con-
sent decrees can improve police compliance with constitutional 
requirements.205 Doubts remain about the sustainability of re-
form after the period of immediate federal supervision expires.206 
 
 202. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(remedial order); Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(liability findings).  
 203. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming the dis-
trict court’s class certification, liability finding, and remedial order, including 
retraining and independent monitoring).  
 204. See Rushin, supra note 201, at 1372–74 (describing negotiations be-
tween “stakeholders” and the DOJ).  
 205. See id. at 1418 (“[G]iven the empirical evidence that SRL can effec-
tively reduce patterns and practices of misconduct, there is a strong argument 
for increasing the number of SRL cases each year.”); see also Joshua Chanin, 
On the Implementation of Pattern or Practice Police Reform, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 
CRIM. JUST. L. & SOC’Y 38, 51 (2014):  
The DOJ’s pattern or practice initiative requires affected jurisdictions 
to implement a series of complex, protracted reforms in order to reach 
compliance with the federal law. The weight of both theory and prac-
tical experience suggest that such an undertaking will be fraught 
with challenges and likely to end in failure. Such has not been the 
case in the vast majority of jurisdictions that have come under federal 
oversight, including four of the five examined here. The implementa-
tion system—defined by the legal authority under which the imple-
mentation proceeds; independent oversight; and well-resourced, high-
ly motivated organizations that are typically led by reform-minded 
chiefs—is indeed both unique and effective. 
 206. See Rushin, supra note 201, at 1410–11; see also Joshua Chanin, Ex-
amining the Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct Reform, 18 
POLICE Q. 163, 185 (2015), http://pqx.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/11/25/ 
1098611114561305 (“The best evidence on the DOJ’s pattern or practice initia-
tive suggests that after implementing mandated reforms, affected depart-
ments will likely possess a stronger, more capable accountability infrastruc-
ture, more robust training, and a set of policies that reflect national best 
practices.”); id. (“The resultant organizational changes are not self-sustaining; 
implementation does not in and of itself guarantee meaningful, institutional-
ized change.”). 
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Whether Congress and the Department of Justice maintain and 
perhaps increase the resources available to enforce the Rodney 
King law is conjectural. Whether the Supreme Court permits 
private suits to go forward by relaxing the justiciability barriers 
erected in older cases is conjectural. The current record, howev-
er, suffices to establish that our society could follow through on 
the regulatory approach to the Fourth Amendment, should it 
choose to do so.  
V.  TWO PROPOSALS FOR REFORM   
I close by suggesting that serious consideration be given to 
two reforms that would move us still further along the path of 
aligning the scope of the Fourth Amendment with contemporary 
values and its content with the regulatory perspective. The first 
of these is the possibility of asking the people themselves, rather 
than the Justices or the framers, about reasonable expectations 
of privacy. The second is to expand the institutional reform con-
cept beyond suits for systemic noncompliance by creating a 
mechanism for the Justice Department to certify police depart-
ments for systemic compliance, together with incentives for de-
partments to obtain that certification.  
A. TAKING KATZ SERIOUSLY: THE CASE FOR ONLINE OPT-OUTS  
Whether we side with Justice Scalia’s Kyllo test by seeking 
the degree of privacy approved by the founders, or Justice Har-
lan’s Katz test asking whether modern “society” recognizes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, we are likely to be troubled 
about the subjectivity of the inquiry. As Professor Amsterdam 
knew, one’s views of the values behind the drafting choices of the 
framers is unlikely to be inconsistent with one’s own first-order 
value preferences. And it has become something of a cliché to 
point out that when the Justices say “society” they mean “us.”  
The same technology that poses so many vexing threats to 
personal privacy and to the construction of principled constitu-
tional doctrine also offers opportunities. We need not indulge the 
fiction that corporate privacy policies nested inside online adhe-
sion contracts reflect actual customary expectations. The inter-
net now enables millions of people to signal their preferences, 
and to alter those signals, instantaneously and at very low cost.  
For example, a new generation of utility meters, so-called 
“smart meters,” enable power providers to receive hour-by-hour 
information about power usage from each consumer. This infor-
mation could enable the utilities to provide more efficient ser-
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vice, but it can also reveal details of life inside the home.207 Some 
utilities have responded to privacy concerns by enabling custom-
ers to opt out of smart-meter service.208 
Consider the government’s position that the third-party doc-
trine justifies accessing subscriber information on a Terry show-
ing. The argument is that having entrusted information to the 
ISP or telecom provider, the individual has no grievance under 
either Katz or a trespass theory when the government forces the 
third party to share the data. As we have seen this is dubious 
under the historical approach and unattractive to many as a con-
temporary matter. But why should we ask the Justices to make 
the normative judgment for us?  
It would be entirely possible for the government to maintain 
a website devoted to recording individual expectations of privacy. 
Suppose the Stored Communications Act were amended to au-
thorize accessing subscriber information on reasonable suspi-
cion, provided the government established an online opt-out sys-
tem by which individuals could put themselves on either a “full 
consent” or a “warrant only” list. The default would be the cur-
rent law’s requirement of a traditional warrant to access content, 
and the Terry standard for accessing envelope and subscriber in-
formation. Before granting an order to compel disclosure by the 
third party, a court would have to check the warrant list to be 
sure that the consumer has not opted out of the reasonable-
suspicion regime.  
We have one informed guess about where “society” thinks 
the balance might be struck—the legislative judgment expressed 
in the SCA. It follows that the legislature’s guess makes a ra-
tional place to establish the default rule. When, however, the 
constitutionality of the legislature’s decision depends on individ-
uals voluntarily assuming the risk that their disclosures will 
pass through to the government, the legislature can only guess 
about what people actually expect. If we cared about actual risk 
assumption we would ask people directly.  
I assume that almost no one would visit a government web-
site to register themselves as “full consent” targets. I expect that 
 
 207. See, e.g., Christina Nunez, Who’s Watching? Privacy Concerns Persist 
as Smart Meters Roll Out, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 14, 2012), http://news 
.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/12/121212-smart-meter-privacy 
(discussing technology that monitors energy use). 
 208. See, e.g., SmartMeter Opt-Out Program, PAC. GAS & ELEC., http://www 
.pge.com/en/myhome/customerservice/smartmeter/optout/index.page (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2016).  
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many but not most would bother to register as “warrant only” 
targets. The practical opportunity to opt out, however, would 
make the silence of the majority a much better indicator of as-
sumed risk than the guesswork of Justices deciding cases framed 
by the exclusionary rule.  
The (very) hypothetical statute has an important implica-
tion for constitutional doctrine in the courts. A government that 
easily could but does not provide an opt out is in a much weaker 
position to claim assumption of risk. One can imagine a Supreme 
Court ruling declaring the SCA unconstitutional because appli-
cation of the third-party doctrine depends on a genuine opt out. 
This very limited retreat from Miller and Smith not only makes 
good sense. It would also justify a narrow judicial intervention 
that would force the hand of Congress. Congressional action 
might provide a comprehensive reform package that would avert 
further constitutional rulings.209  
B. TOWARD REGULATORY REMEDIES: CERTIFICATION FOR  
COMPLIANCE 
On the regulatory view the exclusionary rule is justified by 
the incentives it gives police to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment. Where they are in effect, consent decrees cut to the chase. 
They provide direct mechanisms for disciplining noncompliance, 
either by punishing violations as a contempt by the department 
or by directly requiring investigation and where justified by the 
facts appropriate discipline of individual officers. If we see in 
these decrees the ultimate expression of the regulatory perspec-
tive, we might well consider encouraging this sort of police-
community rule-making under federal oversight to ensure com-
pliance with constitutional requirements. I have a tentative pro-
posal in that direction.  
Suppose Congress authorized (and funded) the Justice De-
partment not just to sue police departments for patterns of viola-
tions, but to advise and cooperate with departments that volun-
tarily sought to adopt best-practices regulations, with 
independent monitoring and enforcement provisions.210 The De-
 
 209. The California Electronic Privacy Act is one example of plausible leg-
islation. S.B. 178, 2015 Leg. (Cal. 2015). 
 210. It might well be that best practices include police rulemaking to cabin 
discretion, while the content of those rules might vary from one department to 
another. Professor Amsterdam called for just such an approach. As Barry 
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko point out, police discretion is an extreme 
outlier from American public law’s general insistence on legality, transparen-
cy, and accountability. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic 
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partment could certify for systemic compliance, just as it can 
now sue for systemic noncompliance. The effect would be to rep-
licate consent decrees without litigation.  
Local political forces might well focus on a department’s re-
fusal to seek certification for a best-practices compliance pro-
gram. A Congress persuaded in the age of Ferguson that the 
Rodney King law was not enough, informed by empirical evi-
dence on successful compliance policies in departments under a 
court order, could find any number of ways to encourage volun-
tary participation by local departments in a certification pro-
gram.211 A very small incentive would be making certification of 
a department a condition of providing military hardware under 
the 1033 and 1122 programs, which make military equipment 
available to police departments either free or at the federal gov-
ernment’s cost.212 Much stronger incentives can be imagined.  
For example, Congress might insist that qualified immunity 
be earned, rather than bestowed indiscriminately by the courts. 
A statute conditioning officer eligibility for the immunity defense 
on DOJ certification of the officer’s department would cost Con-
gress no more money than the cost of the certification program 
itself. Cities, counties, and police departments all but universally 
indemnify their officers.213 Lawyers for these employers of police 
could be counted on to make clear to elected officials the poten-
tially very high price of failing to obtain certification for compli-
ance. In this way we might finally see the full realization of the 
regulatory perspective as a system of rules made in consultation 
 
Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015). A certification program could moti-
vate departments to undertake transparent rulemaking of the sort they sug-
gest. 
 211. Congress commonly conditions federal funds on some sort of ex ante 
certification. For example, under the Higher Education Act, federal financial 
aid is only available to students attending accredited institutions. See Higher 
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099 (2006). 
 212. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Cost of Po-
licing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 924–27 (2015) (describing 1033 and 1122 pro-
grams).  
 213. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
885, 937 (2014): 
Although I do not know for certain whether my findings are con-
sistent with the practices in all jurisdictions nationwide, the eighty-
one jurisdictions in my study are broadly representative in size, loca-
tion, agency type, indemnification policy, and indemnification proce-
dure. My findings therefore at least support the presumption that of-
ficers across the country, in departments large and small, are 
virtually always indemnified. 
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with the police and with effective administrative machinery to 
enforce these regulations.  
  CONCLUSION   
This Article has tried to trace how the Supreme Court has 
largely, but not entirely, embraced the “perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment” favored by Professor Amsterdam. Civil lib-
erties indeed have suffered when the contemporary values of the 
Justices have put security before liberty. So too civil liberties 
have suffered when the rules announced by the Court are over-
inclusive of legitimate security interests and under-inclusive of 
legitimate privacy interests. Yet the case law professes the aim 
of securing police compliance with prevailing social norms. The 
recent resurgence of historicism, and of trespass analysis, is 
more a reflection of, rather than a departure, from this prevail-
ing template.  
Trespass-free surveillance cases, and a thorough empirical 
canvass of institutional reform litigation, will soon shed more 
light on just how far we are prepared to follow Professor Am-
sterdam’s “perspectives.” If we witness a definite reversion to 
narrow historicism and retrospective atomism, I will have mis-
apprehended the long arc of history. Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment would still count as a masterpiece of legal scholar-
ship, one that framed informed thinking about a critical body of 
constitutional law for more than forty years.  
I believe the true test of legal scholarship was captured by 
H.L.A. Hart when he wrote, of Jeremy Bentham, that even 
“where he fails to persuade, he still forces us to think.”214 Long 
ago Professor Amsterdam persuaded me on many matters. On 
others he has been forcing me to think for many years. I have 
advanced some of those thoughts today in a spirit of homage.  
For I agree with Professor Amsterdam that  
when we seek to understand the Supreme Court’s difficulties in grap-
pling with the fourth amendment, we observe the Court in the throes 
of one of its noblest labors. That labor is to be the instrument by 
which a free society imposes on itself the seldom welcome, sometimes 
dangerous, always indispensable restraints that keep it free.215  
If any further words of mine are to be added, let them be 
these four: Re-read. Re-think. Revere. Repeat. 
 
 214. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL 
THEORY 39 (1982).  
 215. Perspectives, supra note 1, at 353.  
